Lindo v. COMELEC

Lindo v. COMELEC

G.R. No. 127311 June 19, 1997

Puno, J.

Facts:

                In the May 8, 1995 elections, petitioner CONRADO LINDO and private respondent ROSARIO VELASCO (incumbent mayor of Ternate, Cavite) were the main rivals for the position of Ternate mayor. On May 9, 1995, petitioner was declared by the board of canvassers as the duly elected mayor, garnering the highest number of votes at 2,711. Private respondent was second with 2,195 votes.

                On May 19, 1996, private respondent, while still discharging her functions as Ternate mayor, filed an election protest contesting the results of the election in all the 19 precincts.

In June, 1995, prior to petitioner’s assumption of the office of Ternate mayor, the ballot boxes of all the protested precincts were transferred from the office of the municipal treasurer to the office of the clerk of court, RTC Naic, for revision of the ballots. Only the ballots from 24 precincts were revised because private respondent abandoned her protest with respect to the other 15 precincts.

The revision showed a substantial variance between the number of votes as stated in the election returns and the number of votes as per physical count of the ballots in five (5) precincts. In view of the above findings, Assisting Judge Emerito M. Agcaoili declared private respondent as the duly elected mayor of Ternate, Cavite. Petitioner was ordered to vacate the office of the Ternate mayor and turn it over to private respondent.

At the hearing on the motion for execution, petitioner claimed that Judge Agcaoili only examined the photocopies of the ballots in deciding the case. Thereafter, respondent Judge Napoleon Dilag took over the protest case and issued an Order granting the motion for execution pending appeal upon private respondent’s filing of a P100,000.00 cash bond. On the same date, Judge Dilag issued the writ of execution directing the PNP Director of Cavite to implement the writ and install private respondent as mayor of Ternate, Cavite.

Petitioner claims that the COMELEC issued the preliminary injunction after finding that the trial court did not examine the original ballots, but relied only on the xerox copies in deciding the protest. Although subsequently COMELEC lifted the injunction, it still made a finding that fake and spurious ballots may have been introduced in the ballot boxes to increase the votes of private respondent. Thus, petitioner contends that the COMELEC should not have allowed the execution of the decision pending appeal and should have opened the ballots boxes to determine the authenticity of the ballots therein.

Issue:

                whether or not COMELEC erred in allowing the implementation of the writ of execution of the decision pending appeal

Held:

                Rule 143 of the Rules of Court allows execution pending appeal in election cases upon good reasons stated in the special order. In its Order of execution, respondent RTC Judge Dilag cited two reasons to justify execution of his decision pending appeal, viz: (1) the grant of execution would give substance and meaning to the people’s mandate, especially since the RTC has established private respondent’s right to office, and; (2) barely 18 months is left on the tenure of the Ternate mayor and the people have the right to be governed by their chosen official. In the recent case of Gutierrez v. COMELEC, the same grounds for execution pending appeal of the decision in the protest case were relied upon by the trial court and we found them to be valid reasons for execution.

                COMELEC did not err in applying Section 2, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court, which provides:

Sec. 2. Execution pending appeal. — On motion of the prevailing party with notice to the adverse party, the court may, in its discretion, order execution to issue before the expiration of the time to appeal, upon good reasons to be stated in a special order. If a record on appeal is filed thereafter, the motion and special order shall be included therein.

Section 2, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court applies suppletorily to election cases. As long as the motion for execution pending appeal is filed before the perfection of appeal, the writ of execution may issue after the period of appeal.

Brillantes v. Yorac

Brillantes v. Yorac

G.R. No. 93867 December 18, 1990

Cruz, J.

Facts:

                The petitioner is challenging the designation by the President of the Philippines of Associate Commissioner Haydee B. Yorac as Acting Chairman of the Commission on Elections, in place of Chairman Hilario B. Davide, who had been named chairman of the fact-finding commission to investigate the December 1989 coup d’ etat attempt.

The petitioner contends that the choice of the Acting Chairman of the Commission on Elections is an internal matter that should be resolved by the members themselves and that the intrusion of the President of the Philippines violates their independence. He cites the practice in the Supreme Court, where the senior Associate Justice serves as Acting Chief Justice in the absence of the Chief Justice. No designation from the President of the Philippines is necessary.

Issue:

                whether the designation of an Acting Chairman of COMELEC is unconstitutional

Held:

                Yes. Article IX-A, Section 1, of the Constitution expressly describes all the Constitutional Commissions as “independent.” Although essentially executive in nature, they are not under the control of the President of the Philippines in the discharge of their respective functions. Each of these Commissions conducts its own proceedings under the applicable laws and its own rules and in the exercise of its own discretion. Its decisions, orders and rulings are subject only to review on Certiorari by the Supreme Court as provided by the Constitution in Article IX-A, Section 7.

The choice of a temporary chairman in the absence of the regular chairman comes under that discretion. That discretion cannot be exercised for it, even with its consent, by the President of the Philippines.

In the choice of the Acting Chairman, the members of the Commission on Elections would most likely have been guided by the seniority rule as they themselves would have appreciated it. In any event, that choice and the basis thereof were for them and not the President to make.

Cayetano v. Monsod

Cayetano v. Monsod

G.R. No. 100113 September 3, 1991

Paras, J.

Facts:

                Respondent Christian Monsod was nominated by President Corazon C. Aquino to the position of Chairman of the COMELEC in a letter received by the Secretariat of the Commission on Appointments on April 25, 1991. Petitioner opposed the nomination because allegedly Monsod does not possess the required qualification of having been engaged in the practice of law for at least ten years.

On June 5, 1991, the Commission on Appointments confirmed the nomination of Monsod as Chairman of the COMELEC. On June 18, 1991, he took his oath of office. On the same day, he assumed office as Chairman of the COMELEC.

Challenging the validity of the confirmation by the Commission on Appointments of Monsod’s nomination, petitioner as a citizen and taxpayer, filed the instant petition for certiorari and Prohibition praying that said confirmation and the consequent appointment of Monsod as Chairman of the Commission on Elections be declared null and void.

Issue:

                whether Monsod has been engaged in the practice of law for at least 10 years

Held:

                Yes. Black defines “practice of law” as:

The rendition of services requiring the knowledge and the application of legal principles and technique to serve the interest of another with his consent. It is not limited to appearing in court, or advising and assisting in the conduct of litigation, but embraces the preparation of pleadings, and other papers incident to actions and special proceedings, conveyancing, the preparation of legal instruments of all kinds, and the giving of all legal advice to clients. It embraces all advice to clients and all actions taken for them in matters connected with the law. An attorney engages in the practice of law by maintaining an office where he is held out to be-an attorney, using a letterhead describing himself as an attorney, counseling clients in legal matters, negotiating with opposing counsel about pending litigation, and fixing and collecting fees for services rendered by his associate. (Black’s Law Dictionary, 3rd ed.)

The Supreme Court in the case of Philippine Lawyers Association v. Agrava stated:

The practice of law is not limited to the conduct of cases or litigation in court; it embraces the preparation of pleadings and other papers incident to actions and special proceedings, the management of such actions and proceedings on behalf of clients before judges and courts, and in addition, conveying. In general, all advice to clients, and all action taken for them in mattersconnected with the law incorporation services, assessment and condemnation services contemplating an appearance before a judicial body, the foreclosure of a mortgage, enforcement of a creditor’s claim in bankruptcy and insolvency proceedings, and conducting proceedings in attachment, and in matters of estate and guardianship have been held to constitute law practice, as do the preparation and drafting of legal instruments, where the work done involves the determination by the trained legal mind of the legal effect of facts and conditions. (5 Am. Jr. p. 262, 263). (Emphasis supplied)

Practice of law under modem conditions consists in no small part of work performed outside of any court and having no immediate relation to proceedings in court. It embraces conveyancing, the giving of legal advice on a large variety of subjects, and the preparation and execution of legal instruments covering an extensive field of business and trust relations and other affairs. Although these transactions may have no direct connection with court proceedings, they are always subject to become involved in litigation. They require in many aspects a high degree of legal skill, a wide experience with men and affairs, and great capacity for adaptation to difficult and complex situations. These customary functions of an attorney or counselor at law bear an intimate relation to the administration of justice by the courts. No valid distinction, so far as concerns the question set forth in the order, can be drawn between that part of the work of the lawyer which involves appearance in court and that part which involves advice and drafting of instruments in his office. It is of importance to the welfare of the public that these manifold customary functions be performed by persons possessed of adequate learning and skill, of sound moral character, and acting at all times under the heavy trust obligations to clients which rests upon all attorneys.

                86-55%. He has been a dues paying member of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines since its inception in 1972-73. He has also been paying his professional license fees as lawyer for more than ten years.

After graduating from the College of Law (U.P.) and having hurdled the bar, Atty. Monsod worked in the law office of his father. During his stint in the World Bank Group (1963-1970), Monsod worked as an operations officer for about two years in Costa Rica and Panama, which involved getting acquainted with the laws of member-countries negotiating loans and coordinating legal, economic, and project work of the Bank. Upon returning to the Philippines in 1970, he worked with the Meralco Group, served as chief executive officer of an investment bank and subsequently of a business conglomerate, and since 1986, has rendered services to various companies as a legal and economic consultant or chief executive officer. As former Secretary-General (1986) and National Chairman (1987) of NAMFREL. Monsod’s work involved being knowledgeable in election law. He appeared for NAMFREL in its accreditation hearings before the Comelec. In the field of advocacy, Monsod, in his personal capacity and as former Co-Chairman of the Bishops Businessmen’s Conference for Human Development, has worked with the under privileged sectors, such as the farmer and urban poor groups, in initiating, lobbying for and engaging in affirmative action for the agrarian reform law and lately the urban land reform bill. Monsod also made use of his legal knowledge as a member of the Davide Commission, a quast judicial body, which conducted numerous hearings (1990) and as a member of the Constitutional Commission (1986-1987), and Chairman of its Committee on Accountability of Public Officers, for which he was cited by the President of the Commission, Justice Cecilia Muñoz-Palma for “innumerable amendments to reconcile government functions with individual freedoms and public accountability and the party-list system for the House of Representative.

Interpreted in the light of the various definitions of the term Practice of law”. particularly the modern concept of law practice, and taking into consideration the liberal construction intended by the framers of the Constitution, Atty. Monsod’s past work experiences as a lawyer-economist, a lawyer-manager, a lawyer-entrepreneur of industry, a lawyer-negotiator of contracts, and a lawyer-legislator of both the rich and the poor — verily more than satisfy the constitutional requirement — that he has been engaged in the practice of law for at least ten years.

Quimson v. Ozaeta

Quimson v. Ozaeta

G.R. No. L-8321 March 26, 1956

Montemayor, J.

Facts:

                The Rural Progress Administration is a public corporation created for the purpose of acquiring landed estates through purchase, expropriation or lease, and later sub-letting or sub-leasing the same to tenants or occupants. The officials and employees of the Administration may be considered as civil service employees embraced in the classified service. Sometime in 1947, one Aurelio R. Peña, then comptroller of the Administration and performing duties of auditor in representation of the Auditor General recommended to the Board of Directors of the Administration that for purposes of economy municipal treasurers be appointed agent-collectors of the Administration, and this recommendation was adopted by the Board of Director. Thereafter, Faustino Aguilar, then manager of the Administration, prepared the appointment for the post of agent- collector on a part-time basis in favor of Plaintiff-Appellant Braulio Quimson, with compensation of P720 per annum, the appointment to take effect upon assumption of duty. At the time, Quimson was deputy provincial treasurer and municipal treasurer of Caloocan, Rizal. Defendant-Appellee Roman Ozaeta who by reason of his office of Secretary of Justice was acting as Chairman of the Board of Directors, signed the appointment and forwarded the papers to the President through the Secretary of Finance for approval. Without waiting for the said approval Quimson assumed his position on May 6, 1948 and rendered service as agent-collector of the Administration until October 21, 1949, inclusive, when he was informed that because of the disapproval of his appointment, his services were considered terminated. There were several objections to his appointment, among them that of the Auditor General on the ground that since Quimson was deputy provincial treasurer and municipal treasurer of Caloocan, his additional compensation as agent-collector would contravene the Constitutional prohibition against double compensation. The Commissioner of Civil Service said that he would offer no objection to the additional compensation of Quimson as agent-collector provided it was authorized in a special provision exempting the case from the inhibition against the payment of extra compensation in accordance with section 259 of the Revised Administrative Code. In this connection, it may be stated that this section of the Administrative Code provides that in the absence of special provision, no officer or employee in any branch of the Government service shall receive additional compensation on account of the discharge of duties pertaining to another or to the performance of public service of whatever nature. Faustino Aguilar as manager of the Administration asked for the reconsideration of the ruling of the Auditor General, alleging that the appointment of the Plaintiff was for reasons of economy and efficiency, but the Auditor General denied the request stating that reasons of economy and efficiency are not valid grounds for evading the constitutional prohibition against additional compensation in the absence of a law specifically authorizing such compensation. So, the services of Quimson as agent-collector of the Administration were terminated. But R. Gonzales Lloret, then manager of the Administration on October 18, 1949, inquired from the auditor of the Administration whether Quimson could be paid for the period of actual service rendered by him from May 10, 1948, and the said auditor gave the opinion that it could not be done for the reason that in his opinion the appointment extended to Quimson was clearly illegal and the Administration may not be obliged to pay him for the services rendered since it was a violation of section 3, Article XII, of the Constitution prohibiting double compensation. At the same time he expressed the opinion that under section 691 of the Revised Administrative Code the appointing official who made the illegal appointment should be made liable for the payment of salary of the appointee, and consequently, Plaintiff should claim his salary for services rendered against said appointing officer. It is highly possible that this opinion was what induced and prompted Quimson to file the present case against Roman Ozaeta who, as Chairman of the Board, signed his appointment, and the members of the said Board, namely: Faustino Aguilar, Vicente Fragante, Roman Fernandez and Pedro Magsalin.

Issue:

                whether or not Plaintiff’s complaint for the recovery of accrued salaries as provincial treasurer and municipal treasurer must be denied on the ground of the constitutional prohibition against double compensation

Held:

                No. Section 691 of the Revised Administrative Code reads as follows:

“SEC. 691.  Payment of person employed contrary to law. — Liability of chief of office. — No person employed in the classified service contrary to law or in violation of the civil service rules shall be entitled to receive pay from the Government; but the chief of the bureau or office responsible for such unlawful employment shall be personally liable for the pay that would have accrued had the employment been lawful, and the disbursing officer shall make payment to the employee of such amount from the salary of the officers so liable.”

Section 691 of the Administrative Code above reproduced refers and applies to unlawful employment and not to unlawful compensation. The appointment or employment of Plaintiff-Appellant Quimson as agent-collector was not in itself unlawful because there is no incompatibility between said appointment and his employment as deputy provincial treasurer and municipal treasurer. In fact, he was appointed agent-collector by reason of his office, being a municipal treasurer. There is no legal objection to a government official occupying two government offices and performing the functions of both as long as there is no incompatibility. Clerks of court are sometimes appointed or designated as provincial sheriffs. Municipal Treasurers like Plaintiffare often appointed and designated as deputy provincial treasurer. The Department Secretaries are often designated to act as Chairman or members of Board of Directors of government corporations. The objection or prohibition refers to double compensation and not to double appointments and performance of functions of more than one office.

According to law, under certain circumstances, the President may authorize double compensation in some cases, such as government officials acting as members with compensation in government examining boards like the bar examinations, or department secretaries acting as members of Board of Directors of government corporations, and in such cases the prohibition against double compensation is not observed. This undoubtedly, was the reason why the appointment of Quimson had to be coursed through different offices like the Department of Finance, the Civil Service Commission, and the Office of the Auditor General to the President for approval. If the President approves the double compensation, well and good. The appointee whose appointment may then be regarded as valid from the beginning could receive extra compensation. If it is disapproved, then the appointment will have to be withdrawn or cancelled, unless of course, the appointee was willing to serve without compensation, in which case there could be no valid objection. This is another proof that the appointment of Quimson was not illegal or unlawful. It was only the double compensation that was subject to objection. The trouble was that Plaintiff herein assumed office without waiting for the result of the action to be taken upon his appointment and compensation by the President and the different offices which the appointment had to go through.

SSSEA v. CA

SSSEA v. CA

G.R. No. 85279 July 28, 1989

Cortes, J.

Facts:

The SSS filed a complaint for damages with a prayer for a writ of preliminary injunction against petitioners, alleging that on June 9, 1987, the officers and members of SSSEA staged an illegal strike and barricaded the entrances to the SSS Building, preventing non-striking employees from reporting for work and SSS members from transacting business with the SSS; that the strike was reported to the Public Sector Labor - Management Council, which ordered the strikers to return to work; that the strikers refused to return to work; and that the SSS suffered damages as a result of the strike. The complaint prayed that a writ of preliminary injunction be issued to enjoin the strike and that the strikers be ordered to return to work; that the petitioners be ordered to pay damages; and that the strike be declared illegal.

The SSSEA went on strike after the SSS failed to act on the union’s demands, which included: implementation of the provisions of the old SSS-SSSEA collective bargaining agreement (CBA) on check-off of union dues; payment of accrued overtime pay, night differential pay and holiday pay; conversion of temporary or contractual employees with 6 months or more of service into regular and permanent employees and their entitlement to the same salaries, allowances and benefits given to other regular employees of the SSS; and payment of the children’s allowance of P30.00, and after the SSS deducted certain amounts from the salaries of the employees and allegedly committed acts of discrimination and unfair labor practices.

The position of the petitioners is that the Regional Trial Court had no jurisdiction to hear the case initiated by the SSS and to issue the restraining order and the writ of preliminary injunction, as jurisdiction lay with the Department of Labor and Employment or the National Labor Relations Commission, since the case involves a labor dispute.

On the other hand, the SSS advances the contrary view, on the ground that the employees of the SSS are covered by civil service laws and rules and regulations, not the Labor Code, therefore they do not have the right to strike. Since neither the DOLE nor the NLRC has jurisdiction over the dispute, the Regional Trial Court may enjoin the employees from striking.

Issues:

1.                    Do the employees of the SSS have the right to strike?

2.                   Does the Regional Trial Court have jurisdiction to hear the case initiated by the SSS and to enjoin the strikers from continuing with the strike and to order them to return to work?

Held:

Considering that under the 1987 Constitution “T]he civil service embraces all branches, subdivisions, instrumentalities, and agencies of the Government, including government-owned or controlled corporations with original charters” [Art. IX(B), Sec. .2(l) see also Sec. 1 of E.O. No. 180 where the employees in the civil service are denominated as “government employees”] and that the SSS is one such government-controlled corporation with an original charter, having been created under R.A. No. 1161, its employees are part of the civil service and are covered by the Civil Service Commission’s memorandum prohibiting strikes. This being the case, the strike staged by the employees of the SSS was illegal.

The general rule is that the terms and conditions of employment in the Government, including any political subdivision or instrumentality thereof are governed by law. Since the terms and conditions of government employment are fixed by law, government workers cannot use the same weapons employed by workers in the private sector to secure concessions from their employers. The principle behind labor unionism in private industry is that industrial peace cannot be secured through compulsion by law. Relations between private employers and their employees rest on an essentially voluntary basis. Subject to the minimum requirements of wage laws and other labor and welfare legislation, the terms and conditions of employment in the unionized private sector are settled through the process of collective bargaining. In government employment, however, it is the legislature and, where properly given delegated power, the administrative heads of government which fix the terms and conditions of employment. And this is effected through statutes or administrative circulars, rules, and regulations, not through collective bargaining agreements.

E.O. No. 180, which provides guidelines for the exercise of the right to organize of government employees, while clinging to the same philosophy, has, however, relaxed the rule to allow negotiation where the terms and conditions of employment involved are not among those fixed by law. Thus: “SECTION 13. Terms and conditions of employment or improvements thereof, except those that are fixed by law, may be the subject of negotiations between duly recognized employees’ organizations and appropriate government authorities.”

The same executive order has also provided for the general mechanism for the settlement of labor disputes in the public sector to wit: “SECTION 16. The Civil Service and labor laws and procedures, whenever applicable, shall be followed in the resolution of complaints, grievances and cases involving government employees. In case any dispute remains unresolved after exhausting all the available remedies under existing laws and procedures, the parties may jointly refer the dispute to the Public Sector Labor- Management Council for appropriate action.”

Government employees may, therefore, through their unions or associations, either petition the Congress for the betterment of the terms and conditions of employment which are within the ambit of legislation or negotiate with the appropriate government agencies for the improvement of those which are not fixed by law. If there be any unresolved grievances, the dispute may be referred to the Public Sector Labor - Management Council for appropriate action. But employees in the civil service may not resort to strikes, walk-outs and other temporary work stoppages, like workers in the private sector, to pressure the Government to accede to their demands. As now provided under Sec. 4, Rule III of the Rules and Regulations to Govern the Exercise of the Right of Government- Employees to Self- Organization, which took effect after the instant dispute arose, “[t]he terms and conditions of employment in the government, including any political subdivision or instrumentality thereof and government- owned and controlled corporations with original charters are governed by law and employees therein shall not strike for the purpose of securing changes thereof.”

The Labor Code itself provides that terms and conditions of employment of government employees shall be governed by the Civil Service Law, rules and regulations. More importantly, E.O. No. 180 vests the Public Sector Labor - Management Council with jurisdiction over unresolved labor disputes involving government employees. Clearly, the NLRC has no jurisdiction over the dispute.

This being the case, the Regional Trial Court was not precluded, in the exercise of its general jurisdiction under B.P. Blg. 129, as amended, from assuming jurisdiction over the SSS’s complaint for damages and issuing the injunctive writ prayed for therein. Unlike the NLRC, the Public Sector Labor - Management Council has not been granted by law authority to issue writs of injunction in labor disputes within its jurisdiction. Thus, since it is the Council, and not the NLRC, that has jurisdiction over the instant labor dispute, resort to the general courts of law for the issuance of a writ of injunction to enjoin the strike is appropriate.

De Los Santos v. Yatco

De Los Santos v. Yatco

G.R. No. L-13932 December 24, 1959

Bengzon, J.

Facts:

                Petitioner files for certiorari to revoke the order of respondent Judge Yatco for cancelling his previous order for execution on the parcel of land owned by the petitioner. The said parcel of land is being occupied by Fernando Mendoñez with an agreement to pay in installment the said land to the petitioners and that he shall voluntarily vacate the land and the payments he previously made shall be forfeited in favor of the plaintiff. A civil case was filed by the petitioner against Mendoñez for failure to pay as per agreement of both parties. Petitioner later filed a motion for execution to take the land back. Defendant Mendoñez moved for postponement to give both parties sufficient time to come to an agreement which was allowed by the respondent judge. It was settled by both parties that Mendoñez will secure a GSIS loan however when he was ready to make the payment the petitioner refused to abide with their agreement and now asking for a higher amount of money for payment. Finding no justification on the issuance of the writ of execution, Judge Yatco quashed said order hence this petition for certiorari based on lack of jurisdiction or abuse of discretion.

Issue:

                whether or not the respondent judge acted in lack of jurisdiction or abuse of discretion

Held:

                The court held that any judge has the jurisdiction to quash any writ of execution issued by him especially when it was improvidently issued. There is no abuse of discretion by the judge since the defendant made an opposition and proved that there is subsequent verbal agreement that amended the compromise hence the execution cannot be validly decreed without a hearing. The consequent ability of the defendant to meet his obligations by securing a GSIS loan also justifies the court’s refusal to eject him from the premises by an execution.

Province of Camarines Sur v. CA

Province of Camarines Sur v. CA

G.R. No. 104639 July 14, 1995

Quiason, J.

Facts:

                In January 1, 1960 - private respondent Dato was appointed as Private Agent by the then Gov. of Camarines Sur, Apolonio Maleniza.

October 12, 1972 - Dato was promoted and appointed Assistant Provincial Warden by then Gov. Felix Alfelor, Sr.

Dato had no civil service eligibility for the position he was appointed to, thus, he could not be legally extended a permanent appointment. He was extended a temporary appointment, which was renewed annually.

January 1, 1974 – Gov. Alfelor approved the change in Dato’s employment status from temporary to permanent upon the latter’s representation that he passed the civil service examination for supervising security guards. Said change of status however, was not favorably acted upon by the Civil Service Commission (CSC) reasoning that Dato did not possess the necessary civil service eligibility for the office he was appointed to. His appointment remained temporary and no other appointment was extended to him.

March 16, 1976 – Dato was indefinitely suspended by Gov. Alfelor after criminal charges were filed against him and a prison guard for allegedly conniving and/or consenting to evasion of sentence of some detention prisoners who escaped from confinement.

Two years after the request for change of status was made, Mr. Lope B. Rama, head of the Camarines Sur Unit of the Civil Service Commission, wrote the Gov. a letter informing him that the status of private respondent Dato has been changed from temporary to permanent, the latter having passed the examination for Supervising Security Guard. The change of status was to be made retroactive to June 11, 1974, the date of release of said examination.

Sangguniang Panlalawigan, suppressed the appropriation for the position of Assistant Provincial Warden and deleted private respondent’s name from the petitioner’s plantilla.

Dato was subsequently acquitted of the charges against him. Consequently, he requested the Gov. for reinstatement and backwages.

His request was not heeded. Dato filed an action before the RTC.

RTC Decision: Ordered the payment of backwages of Dato equivalent to five years. Province of Camarines Sur appealed the decision to the CA.

CA: Affirmed RTC’s decision. Hence the present petition.

Issue:

                whether or not Dato was a permanent employee of petitioner Province of Camarines Sur at the time he was suspended on March 16, 1976

Petitioner’s contention: When Gov. Alfelor recommended to CSC the change in the employment status of private respondent from temporary to permanent, which the CSC approved as only temporary pending validation of the results of private respondent’s examination for supervising security guard, private respondent’s appointment in effect remained temporary. Hence, his subsequent qualification for civil service eligibility did not ipso facto convert his temporary status to that of permanent.

Held:

                The Court agreed with petitioner’s contentions. Dato, being merely a temporary employee, is not entitled to his claim for backwages for the entire period of his suspension.

                At the time Dato was appointed Assistant Provincial Warden on January 1, 1974, he had not yet qualified in an appropriate examination for the aforementioned position. Such lack of a civil service eligibility made his appointment temporary and without a fixed and definite term and is dependent entirely upon the pleasure of the appointing power.

The fact that private respondent obtained civil service eligibility later on is of no moment as his having passed the supervising security guard examination, did not ipso facto convert his temporary appointment into a permanent one.  What is required is a new appointment since a permanent appointment is not a continuation of the temporary appointment — these are two distinct acts of the appointing authority

The letter communicated by Mr. Lope Rama to the Gov. of Camarines Sur is a clear arrogation of power properly belonging to the appointing authority. CSC has the power to approve or disapprove an appointment set before it. It does not have the power to make the appointment itself or to direct the appointing authority to change the employment status of an employee. CSC should have ended its participation in the appointment of private respondent on January 1, 1974 when it confirmed the temporary status of the latter who lacked the proper civil service eligibility. When it issued the foregoing communication on March 19, 1976, it stepped on the toes of the appointing authority, thereby encroaching on the discretion vested solely upon the latter.