De La Llana v. Alba

De La Llana v. Alba

G.R. No. L-57883 March 12, 1982

Fernando, C.J.

Facts:

                On August 7, 1980, a Presidential Committee on Judicial Reorganization was organized. This Executive Order was later amended by Executive Order No. 619-A., dated September 5 of that year. It clearly specified the task assigned to it: “1. The Committee shall formulate plans on the reorganization of the Judiciary which shall be submitted within seventy (70) days from August 7, 1980 to provide the President sufficient options for the reorganization of the entire Judiciary which shall embrace all lower courts, including the Court of Appeals, the Courts of First Instance, the City and Municipal Courts, and all Special Courts, but excluding the Sandigan Bayan.” On October 17, 1980, a Report was submitted by such Committee on Judicial Reorganization. It began with this paragraph: “The Committee on Judicial Reorganization has the honor to submit the following Report. It expresses at the outset its appreciation for the opportunity accorded it to study ways and means for what today is a basic and urgent need, nothing less than the restructuring of the judicial system. There are problems, both grave and pressing, that call for remedial measures. The felt necessities of the time  admit of no delay, for if no step be taken and at the earliest opportunity, it is not too much to say that the people’s faith in the administration of justice could be shaken. It is imperative that there be a greater efficiency in the disposition of cases and that litigants, especially those of modest means — much more so, the poorest and the humblest — can vindicate their rights in an expeditious and inexpensive manner. The rectitude and the fairness in the way the courts operate must be manifest to all members of the community and particularly to those whose interests are affected by the exercise of their functions. It is to that task that the Committee addresses itself and hopes that the plans submitted could be a starting point for an institutional reform in the Philippine judiciary. The experience of the Supreme Court, which since 1973 has been empowered to supervise inferior courts, from the Court of Appeals to the municipal courts, has proven that reliance on improved court management as well as training of judges for more efficient administration does not suffice.

                There is no denying, therefore, the need for “institutional reforms,” characterized in the Report as “both pressing and urgent.” It is worth noting, likewise, as therein pointed out, that a major reorganization of such scope, if it were to take place, would be the most thorough after four generations. The reference was to the basic Judiciary Act generations . enacted in June of 1901, amended in a significant way, only twice previous to the Commonwealth. There was, of course, the creation of the Court of Appeals in 1935, originally composed “of a Presiding Judge and ten appellate Judges, who shall be appointed by the President of the Philippines, with the consent of the Commission on Appointments of the National Assembly, It could “sit en banc, but it may sit in two divisions, one of six and another of five Judges, to transact business, and the two divisions may sit at the same time.” Two years after the establishment of independence of the Republic of the Philippines, the Judiciary Act of 1948 was passed. It continued the existing system of regular inferior courts, namely, the Court of Appeals, Courts of First Instance, the Municipal Courts, at present the City Courts, and the Justice of the Peace Courts, now the Municipal Circuit Courts and Municipal Courts. The membership of the Court of Appeals has been continuously increased. Under a 1978 Presidential Decree, there would be forty-five members, a Presiding Justice and forty-four Associate Justices, with fifteen divisions. Special courts were likewise created. The first was the Court of Tax Appeals in 1954, next came the Court of Agrarian Relations in 1955, and then in the same year a Court of the Juvenile and Domestic Relations for Manila in 1955, subsequently followed by the creation of two other such courts for Iloilo and Quezon City in 1966. In 1967, Circuit Criminal Courts were established, with the Judges having the same qualifications, rank, compensation, and privileges as judges of Courts of First Instance.

                Cabinet Bill No. 42 became the basis of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129. After setting forth the background as above narrated, its Explanatory Note continues: “Pursuant to the President’s instructions, this proposed legislation has been drafted in accordance with the guidelines of that report with particular attention to certain objectives of the reorganization, to wit, the attainment of more efficiency in disposal of cases, a reallocation of jurisdiction, and a revision of procedures which do not tend to the proper meeting out of justice. In consultation with, and upon a consensus of, the governmental and parliamentary leadership, however, it was felt that some options set forth in the Report be not availed of. Instead of the proposal to confine the jurisdiction of the intermediate appellate court merely to appellate adjudication, the preference has been opted to increase rather than diminish its jurisdiction in order to enable it to effectively assist the Supreme Court. This preference has been translated into one of the innovations in the proposed Bill.” Stress was laid by the sponsor that the enactment of such Cabinet Bill would, firstly, result in the attainment of more efficiency in the disposal of cases. Secondly, the improvement in the quality of justice dispensed by the courts is expected as a necessary consequence of the easing of the court’s dockets. Thirdly, the structural changes introduced in the bill, together with the reallocation of jurisdiction and the revision of the rules of procedure, are designated to suit the court system to the exigencies of the present day Philippine society, and hopefully, of the foreseeable future.”

Issue:

                whether B.P. Blg. 129 is unconstitutional

Held:

                No. The abolition of an office within the competence of a legitimate body if done in good faith suffers from no infirmity. The abolition of an office does not amount to an illegal removal of its incumbent is the principle that, in order to be valid, the abolition must be made in good faith. The test remains whether the abolition is in good faith. As that element is conspicuously present in the enactment of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, then the lack of merit of this petition becomes even more apparent. The legislature may abolish courts inferior to the Supreme Court and therefore may reorganize them territorially or otherwise thereby necessitating new appointments and commissions.

                The challenged statute creates an intermediate appellate court, regional trial courts, metropolitan trial courts of the national capital region, and other metropolitan trial courts, municipal trial courts in cities, as well as in municipalities, and municipal circuit trial courts. There is even less reason then to doubt the fact that existing inferior courts were abolished. For the Batasang Pambansa, the establishment of such new inferior courts was the appropriate response to the grave and urgent problems that pressed for solution. Certainly, there could be differences of opinion as to the appropriate remedy. The choice, however, was for the Batasan to make, not for the Supreme Court, which deals only with the question of power.

                Petitioners contend that the abolition of the existing inferior courts collides with the security of tenure enjoyed by incumbent Justices and judges under Article X, Section 7 of the Constitution. There was a similar provision in the 1935 Constitution. It did not, however, go as far as conferring on this Tribunal the power to supervise administratively inferior courts. Moreover, the Supreme Court is empowered “to discipline judges of inferior courts and, by a vote of at least eight members, order their dismissal.” Thus it possesses the competence to remove judges. Under the Judiciary Act, it was the President who was vested with such power. Removal is, of course, to be distinguished from termination by virtue of the abolition of the office. There can be no tenure to a non-existent office. After the abolition, there is in law no occupant. In case of removal, there is an office with an occupant who would thereby lose his position. It is in that sense that from the standpoint of strict law, the question of any impairment of security of tenure does not arise. Nonetheless, for the incumbents of inferior courts abolished, the effect is one of separation. As to its effect, no distinction exists between removal and the abolition of the office. Realistically, it is devoid of significance. He ceases to be a member of the judiciary.

Neither is there any intrusion into who shall be appointed to the vacant positions created by the reorganization. That remains in the hands of the Executive to whom it properly belongs. There is no departure therefore from the tried and tested ways of judicial power. In the exercise of the conceded power of reorganizing tulle inferior courts, the power of removal of the present incumbents vested in this Tribunal is ignored or disregarded. The challenged Act would thus be free from any unconstitutional taint.