Quilona v. General Court Martial

Quilona v. General Court Martial

G.R. No. 96607 March 4, 1992

Padilla, J.

Facts:

           The petitioner, a policeman assigned at the Western Police District (WPD), was charged before respondent General Court Martial with the crime of murder on two (2) counts, under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code.

On 14 December 1990, petitioner, through counsel, wrote a letter to President Corazon C. Aquino, expressing his desire to be tried by a civilian court and sought a waiver of a military jurisdiction, for the reason, among others, that the “enactment of the Philippine National Police Law creates his honest belief that he should now be under the actual and real jurisdiction of a civilian court.

At the scheduled arraignment on 15 December 1990, petitioner’s counsel manifested to respondent General Court Martial his client’s desire not to be arraigned and to be tried by a civilian court, furnishing respondent court martial a copy of petitioner’s letter to the President. The petitioner’s arraignment was reset.

At the next scheduled arraignment of petitioner on 28 December 1990, the petitioner filed a pleading denominated as “MOTION FOR THIS HONORABLE COURT MARTIAL TO INHIBIT ITSELF FROM PURSUING THE ARRAIGNMENT OF THE ACCUSED AND TO HAVE HIS CASE INVESTIGATED BY THE CIVILIAN PROSECUTOR OR AT LEAST TRIED BY A CIVILIAN COURT”. Although set for oral argument on 3 January 1991, respondent court decided to have the motion argued on the day it was filed — 28 December 1990. And after a ten-minute closed-door deliberation among the members of respondent court martial, it resumed session where it denied the petitioner’s aforesaid motion. Petitioner, through counsel, moved for a reconsideration and asked that he be allowed to file his arguments on the next day. Respondent court, however, denied the motion and proceeded to read the charges and specifications to petitioner. Petitioner refused to enter a plea and manifested that he would elevate the matter to the Supreme Court. Nevertheless, respondent court ordered the entry of a “Plea of Not Guilty” and set the trial of the case to 25 January 1991. 3

Issue:

                whether or not a policeman may be tried in a civil court instead of court martial because of the enactment of the PNP Law

Held:

                Yes. Republic Act No. 6975, creating the Philippine National Police (PNP), which took effect on 1 January 1991, provides:

SEC. 46. Jurisdiction in Criminal Cases. — Any provision of law to the contrary notwithstanding, criminal cases involving PNP members shall be within the exclusive jurisdiction of the regular courts;Provided, That the courts-martial appointed pursuant to Presidential Decree No. 1850 shall continue to try PC-INP members who have already been arraigned, to include appropriate actions thereon by the reviewing authorities pursuant to Commonwealth Act No. 408, otherwise known as the Articles of War, as amended by Executive Order No. 178, otherwise known as the Manual for Courts-Martial:Provided, further, that criminal cases against PC-INP members who may have not yet been arraigned upon the effectivity of this Act shall be transferred to the proper city or provincial prosecutor or municipal trial court judge. (Emphasis supplied)

Although Republic Act No. 6975 was not yet in effect when petitioner was arraigned on 28 December 1990, nevertheless, respondent court martial knew or should have known that the said Act had already been signed or approved by the President on 13 December 1990 and that the same was published in two (2) national newspaper of general circulation on 17 December 1990 and that it would take effect on 1 January 1991. It is precisely for this reason that respondent court martial decided to have the petitioner’s motion to inhibit argued on 28 December 1990 and thereafter arraigned the petitioner on the same day despite his vehement refusal to enter a plea.

Clearly, under the circumstances obtaining in the present case, respondent court martial acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to or excess of jurisdiction in proceeding with the arraignment of the petitioner on 28 December 1990.

The civilian character with which the PNP is expressly invested is declared by RA 6975 as paramount, and, in line therewith, the law mandates the transfer of criminal cases against its members to civilian courts.

By closing its eyes to the provisions of Sections 2 and 46, indelicately asserting its military jurisdiction rather than letting go of the case to civilian jurisdiction to effectuate and give flesh to the avowed policy and intent of the law, respondent Court committed grave abuse of discretion.

As long as the civil courts in the land are open and functioning, military tribunals cannot try and exercise jurisdiction over civilians for offenses committed by them. Whether or not martial law has been proclaimed throughout the country or over a part thereof is of no moment. The imprimatur for this observation is found in Section 18, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution, to wit —

A state of martial law, does not suspend the operation of the Constitution, nor supplant the functioning of the civil courts or legislative assemblies, nor authorize the conferment of jurisdiction on military courts and agencies over civilians where civil courts are able to function, nor automatically suspend the privilege of the writ.