Maceda v. Vasquez

Maceda v. Vasquez

G.R. No. 102781. April 22, 1993.

Nocon, J.

Facts:

                Petitioner Bonifacio Sanz Maceda, Presiding Judge of Branch 12 of the Regional Trial Court of Antique, seeks the review of the following orders of the Office of the Ombudsman: (1) the Order dated September 18, 1991 denying the ex-parte motion to refer to the Supreme Court filed by petitioner; and (2) the Order dated November 22, 1951 denying petitioner’s motion for reconsideration and directing petitioner to file his counter-affidavit and other controverting evidences.

In his affidavit-complaint dated April 18, 1991 filed before the Office of the Ombudsman, respondent Napoleon A. Abiera of the Public Attorney’s Office alleged that petitioner had falsified his Certificate of Service 1 dated February 6, 1989, by certifying “that all civil and criminal cases which have been submitted for decision or determination for a period of 90 days have been determined and decided on or before January 31, 1998,” when in truth and in fact, petitioner knew that no decision had been rendered in five (5) civil and ten (10) criminal cases that have been submitted for decision. Respondent Abiera further alleged that petitioner similarly falsified his certificates of service for the months of February, April, May, June, July and August, all in 1989; and the months beginning January up to September 1990, or for a total of seventeen (17) months.

On the other hand, petitioner contends that he had been granted by the Supreme Court an extension of ninety (90) days to decide the aforementioned cases.

Issue:

                whether the Office of the Ombudsman could entertain a criminal complaint for the alleged falsification of a judge’s certification submitted to the Supreme Court, and assuming that it can, whether a referral should be made first to the Supreme Court

Held:

                In the absence of any administrative action taken against him by the Supreme Court with regard to his certificates of service, the investigation being conducted by the Ombudsman encroaches into the Court’s power of administrative supervision over all courts and its personnel, in violation of the doctrine of separation of powers.

Article VIII, section 6 of the 1987 Constitution exclusively vests in the Supreme Court administrative supervision over all courts and court personnel, from the Presiding Justice of the Court of Appeals down to the lowest municipal trial court clerk. By virtue of this power, it is only the Supreme Court that can oversee the judges’ and court personnel’s compliance with all laws, and take the proper administrative action against them if they commit any violation thereof. No other branch of government may intrude into this power, without running afoul of the doctrine of separation of powers.

Thus, the Ombudsman should first refer the matter of petitioner’s certificates of service to the Supreme Court for determination of whether said certificates reflected the true status of his pending case load, as the Supreme Court has the necessary records to make such a determination. The Ombudsman cannot compel the Supreme Court, as one of the three branches of government, to submit its records, or to allow its personnel to testify on this matter, as suggested by public respondent Abiera in his affidavit-complaint.

In fine, where a criminal complaint against a Judge or other court employee arises from their administrative duties, the Ombudsman must defer action on said complaint and refer the same to the Supreme Court for determination whether said Judge or court employee had acted within the scope of their administrative duties.