Peralta v. Director of Prisons

G.R. No. L-49 November 12, 1945

Feria, J.

Facts:

                Petitioner-defendant, a member of the Metropolitan Constabulary of Manila charged with the supervision and control of the production, procurement and distribution of goods and other necessaries as defined in section 1 of Act No. 9 of the National Assembly of the so-called Republic of the Philippines, was prosecuted for the crime of robbery as defined and penalized by section 2 (a) of Act No. 65 of the same Assembly. He was found guilty and sentenced to life imprisonmentby the Court of Special and Exclusive Criminal Jurisdiction, created in section 1 of Ordinance No. 7 promulgated by the President of the so-called Republic of the Philippines, pursuant to the authority conferred upon him by the Constitution and laws of the said Republic. And the procedure followed in the trial was the summary one established in Chapter II of Executive Order No. 157 of the Chairman of the Executive Commission, made applicable to the trial violations of said Act No. 65 by section 9 thereof and section 5 of said Ordinance No. 7.

The petition for habeas corpus is based on the ground that the Court of Special and Executive Criminal Jurisdiction created by Ordinance No. 7 “was a political instrumentality of the military forces of the Japanese Imperial Army, the aims and purposes of which are repugnant to those aims and political purposes of the Commonwealth of the Philippines, as well as those of the United States of America, and therefore, null and void ab initio,” that the provisions of said Ordinance No. 7 are violative of the fundamental laws of the Commonwealth of the Philippines and “the petitioner has been deprived of his constitutional rights”; that the petitioner herein is being punished by a law created to serve the political purpose of the Japanese Imperial Army in the Philippines, and “that the penalties provided for are much (more) severe than the penalties provided for in the Revised Penal Code.”

The features of the summary procedure adopted by Ordinance No. 7, assailed by the petitioner and the Solicitor General as impairing the constitutional rights of an accused are: that court may interrogate the accused and witnesses before trial in order to clarify the points in dispute; that the refusal of the accused to answer the questions may be considered unfavorable to him; that if from the facts admitted at the preliminary interrogatory it appears that the defendant is guilty, he may be immediately convicted; and that the sentence of the sentence of the court is not appealable, except in case of death penalty which cannot be executed unless and until reviewed and affirmed by a special division of the Supreme Court composed of three Justices.

Issue:

                whether Ordinance No. 7 is functus officio by reason sentence of the reoccupation of the Philippines and the restoration therein of the Commonwealth Government

Held:

                Yes. In general, the cast of the occupant possess legal validity, and under international law should not be abrogated by the subsequent government. But this rule does not necessarily apply to acts that exceed the occupant’s power (e.g., alienation of the domains of the State or the sovereign), to sentences for ‘war treason’ and ‘war crimes,’ to acts of a political character, and to those that beyond the period of occupation. When occupation ceases, no reparation is legally due for what has already been carried out.

All judgments of political complexion of the courts during the Japanese regime, ceased to be valid upon the reoccupation of the islands by virtue of the principle or right of postliminium. Applying that doctrine to the present case, the sentence which convicted the petitioner of a crime of a political complexion must be considered as having ceased to be valid ipso facto upon the reoccupation or liberation of the Philippines by General Douglas MacArthur.

The punitive sentence under consideration, although good and valid during the military occupation of the Philippines by the Japanese forces, ceased to be good and valid ipso facto upon the reoccupation of these Island and the restoration therein of the Commonwealth Government.

Laurel v. Misa

G.R. No. L-409 March 28, 1946

Bengzon, J.

Held:

                A citizen or subject owes, not a qualified and temporary, but an absolute and permanent allegiance, which consists in the obligation of fidelity and obedience to his government or sovereign; and that this absolute and permanent allegiance should not be confused with the qualified and temporary allegiance which a foreigner owes to the government or sovereign of the territory wherein he resides, so long as he remains there, in return for the protection he receives, and which consists in the obedience to the laws of the government or sovereign.

                The absolute and permanent allegiance of the inhabitants of a territory occupied by the enemy of their legitimate government or sovereign is not abrogated or severed by the enemy occupation, because the sovereignty of the government or sovereignde jure is not transferred thereby to the occupier, and if it is not transferred to the occupant it must necessarily remain vested in the legitimate government; that the sovereignty vested in the titular government (which is the supreme power which governs a body politic or society which constitute the state) must be distinguished from the exercise of the rights inherent thereto, and may be destroyed, or severed and transferred to another, but it cannot be suspended because the existence of sovereignty cannot be suspended without putting it out of existence or divesting the possessor thereof at least during the so-called period of suspension; that what may be suspended is the exercise of the rights of sovereignty with the control and government of the territory occupied by the enemy passes temporarily to the occupant; that the subsistence of the sovereignty of the legitimate government in a territory occupied by the military forces of the enemy during the war, “although the former is in fact prevented from exercising the supremacy over them” is one of the “rules of international law of our times”; recognized, by necessary implication, in articles 23, 44, 45, and 52 of Hague Regulation; and that, as a corollary of the conclusion that the sovereignty itself is not suspended and subsists during the enemy occupation, the allegiance of the inhabitants to their legitimate government or sovereign subsists, and therefore there is no such thing as suspended allegiance, the basic theory on which the whole fabric of the petitioner’s contention rests.

                A foreign country, in the same way an inhabitant of a territory occupied by the military forces of the enemy may commit treason against his own legitimate government or sovereign if he adheres to the enemies of the latter by giving them aid and comfort; and that if the allegiance of a citizen or subject to his government or sovereign is nothing more than obedience to its laws in return for the protection he receives, it would necessarily follow that a citizen who resides in a foreign country or state would, on one hand, ipso facto acquire the citizenship thereof since he has enforce public order and regulate the social and commercial life, in return for the protection he receives, and would, on the other hand, lose his original citizenship, because he would not be bound to obey most of the laws of his own government or sovereign, and would not receive, while in a foreign country, the protection he is entitled to in his own.

                As a corollary of the suspension of the exercise of the rights of sovereignty by the legitimate government in the territory occupied by the enemy military forces, because the authority of the legitimate power to govern has passed into the hands of the occupant (Article 43, Hague Regulations), the political laws which prescribe the reciprocal rights, duties and obligation of government and citizens, are suspended or in abeyance during military occupation, for the only reason that as they exclusively bear relation to the ousted legitimate government, they are inoperative or not applicable to the government established by the occupant; that the crimes against national security, such as treason and espionage; inciting to war, correspondence with hostile country, flight to enemy’s country, as well as those against public order, such as rebellion, sedition, and disloyalty, illegal possession of firearms, which are of political complexion because they bear relation to, and are penalized by our Revised Penal Code as crimes against the legitimate government, are also suspended or become inapplicable as against the occupant, because they cannot be committed against the latter; and that, while the offenses against public order to be preserved by the legitimate government were inapplicable as offenses against the invader for the reason above stated, unless adopted by him, were also inoperative as against the ousted government for the latter was not responsible for the preservation of the public order in the occupied territory, yet article 114 of the said Revised Penal Code, was applicable to treason committed against the national security of the legitimate government, because the inhabitants of the occupied territory were still bound by their allegiance to the latter during the enemy occupation.

                Although the military occupant is enjoined to respect or continue in force, unless absolutely prevented by the circumstances, those laws that enforce public order and regulate the social and commercial life of the country, he has, nevertheless, all the powers of de facto government and may, at his pleasure, either change the existing laws or make new ones when the exigencies of the military service demand such action, that is, when it is necessary for the occupier to do so for the control of the country and the protection of his army, subject to the restrictions or limitations imposed by the Hague Regulations, the usages established by civilized nations, the laws of humanity and the requirements of public conscience; and that, consequently, all acts of the military occupant dictated within these limitations are obligatory upon the inhabitants of the territory, who are bound to obey them, and the laws of the legitimate government which have not been adopted, as well and those which, though continued in force, are in conflict with such laws and orders of the occupier, shall be considered as suspended or not in force and binding upon said inhabitants.

Since the preservation of the allegiance or the obligation of fidelity and obedience of a citizen or subject to his government or sovereign does not demand from him a positive action, but only passive attitude or forbearance from adhering to the enemy by giving the latter aid and comfort, the occupant has no power, as a corollary of the preceding consideration, to repeal or suspend the operation of the law of treason, essential for the preservation of the allegiance owed by the inhabitants to their legitimate government, or compel them to adhere and give aid and comfort to him; because it is evident that such action is not demanded by the exigencies of the military service or not necessary for the control of the inhabitants and the safety and protection of his army, and because it is tantamount to practically transfer temporarily to the occupant their allegiance to the titular government or sovereign; and that, therefore, if an inhabitant of the occupied territory were compelled illegally by the military occupant, through force, threat or intimidation, to give him aid and comfort, the former may lawfully resist and die if necessary as a hero, or submit thereto without becoming a traitor.

The crime of treason against the government of the Philippines defined and penalized in article 114 of the Penal Code, though originally intended to be a crime against said government as then organized by authority of the sovereign people of the United States, exercised through their authorized representative, the Congress and the President of the United States, was made, upon the establishment of the Commonwealth Government in 1935, a crime against the Government of the Philippines established by authority of the people of the Philippines, in whom the sovereignty resides according to section 1, Article II, of the Constitution of the Philippines, by virtue of the provision of section 2, Article XVI thereof, which provides that “All laws of the Philippine Islands . . . shall remain operative, unless inconsistent with this Constitution . . . and all references in such laws to the Government or officials of the Philippine Islands, shall be construed, in so far as applicable, to refer to the Government and corresponding officials under this constitution.”