Almeda v. CA

Almeda v. CA

G.R. No. L-43800 July 29, 1977

Martin, J.

Held:

                Property ownership is impressed with social function. Property use must not only be for the benefit of the owner but of society as well. The State, in the promotion of social justice, may regulate the acquisition, ownership, use, enjoyment and disposition of private property, and equitably diffuse property ownership and profits. One governmental policy of recent date project emancipation of tenants from the bondage of the soil and the transfer to them of the ownership of the land they till. This is Presidential Decree No. 27 of October 21, 1972, ordaining that all tenant farmers of private agricultural lands devoted to rice and corn under a system of sharecrop or lease tenancy whether classified as landed estates or not shall be deemed owner of a portion constituting a family-size farm of five (5) hectares if not irrigated and three (3) hectares if irrigated.

People v. Lagman

People v. Lagman

G.R. No. L-45892 July 13, 1938

Avanceña, J.

Facts:

                The appellants Tranquilino and Primitivo de Sosa are charged with a violation of section 60 of Commonwealth Act No. 1, known as the National Defense Law. It is alleged that these two appellants, being Filipinos and having reached the age of twenty years in 1936, willfully and unlawfully refused to register in the military service between the 1st and 7th of April of said year, notwithstanding the fact that they had been required to do so. The evidence shows that these two appellants were duly notified by the corresponding authorities to appear before the Acceptance Board in order to register for military service in accordance with law, and that the said appellants, in spite of these notices, had not registered up to the date of the filing of the information.

The appellants do not deny these facts, but they allege in defense that they have not registered in the military service because Primitivo de Sosa is fatherless and has a mother and a brother eight years old to support, and Tranquilino Lagman also has a father to support, has no military learnings, and does not wish to kill or be killed.

Issue:

                whether or not the National Defense Law requiring compulsory military service is a valid exercise of police power

Held:

                Yes. Section 2, Article II of the Constitution of the Philippines provides as follows:

SEC. 2. The defense of the state is a prime duty of government, and in the fulfillment of this duty all citizens may be required by law to render personal military or civil service.

The National Defense Law, in so far as it establishes compulsory military service, does not go against this constitutional provision but is, on the contrary, in faithful compliance therewith. The duty of the Government to defend the State cannot be performed except through an army. To leave the organization of an army to the will of the citizens would be to make this duty of the Government excusable should there be no sufficient men who volunteer to enlist therein.

The right of the Government to require compulsory military service is a consequence of its duty to defend the State and is reciprocal with its duty to defend the life, liberty, and property of the citizen. A person may be compelled by force, if need be, against his will, against his pecuniary interests, and even against his religious or political convictions, to take his place in the ranks of the army of his country, and risk the chance of being shot down in its defense. This is not deprivation of property without due process of law, because, in its just sense, there is no right of property to an office or employment.

In re: Garcia

In re: Garcia

Facts:

                Arturo E. Garcia has applied for admission to the practice of law in the Philippines without submitting to the required bar examinations. In his verified petition, he avers among others that he is a Flipino citizen born in Bacolod City of Filipino parentage. He finished Bachillerato Superior in Spain. He was allowed to practice law profession in Spain under the provision of the treaty on academic degrees and the exercise of profession between the Republic of the Philippines.

Issue:

                whether or not a treaty can modify regulations governing admission to the Philippine Bar

Held:

                No. The provision of the treaty on academic degrees between the republic of the Philippines and Spanish state cannot be invoked by the applicant. Said treaty was intended to govern Filipino citizens desiring to practice their profession in Spain. The treaty could not have been intended to modify the laws and regulations governing admission to the practice of law in the Philippines, for the reason the executive may not encroach upon the constitutional prerogative of the Supreme Court to promulgate rules for admission to the practice of the law in the Philippines. The power to repeal, alter or supplement such rules being reserved only to the congress of the Philippines.

Gonzales v. Hechanova

Gonzales v. Hechanova

G.R. No. L-21897 October 22, 1963

Concepcion, J.

Facts:

                On September 22, 1963, respondent Executive Secretary authorized the importation of 67,000 tons of foreign rice to be purchased from private sources, and created a rice procurement committee composed of the other respondents herein1 for the implementation of said proposed importation. Thereupon, or September 25, 1963, herein petitioner, Ramon A. Gonzales — a rice planter, and president of the Iloilo Palay and Corn Planters Association, whose members are, likewise, engaged in the production of rice and corn — filed the petition herein, averring that, in making or attempting to make said importation of foreign rice, the aforementioned respondents “are acting without jurisdiction or in excess of jurisdiction”, because Republic Act No. 3452 which allegedly repeals or amends Republic Act No. 220.

Issue:

                whether the enactment of RA 2207 nad 345 providing for the importation of foreign rice is a valid exercise of police power

Held:

                No. The attempt to justify these laws by invoking reasons of national security — predicated upon the worsening situation in Laos and Vietnam”, and the tension created by the Malaysia problem and the alleged powers of the President as Commander-in-Chief of all armed forces in the Philippines, under Section 2 of the National Defense Act (Commonwealth Act No. 1), overlooks the fact that the protection of local planters of rice and corn in a manner that would foster and accelerate self-sufficiency in the local production of said commodities constitutes a factor that is vital to our ability to meet possible national emergency. Even if the intent in importing goods in anticipation of such emergency were to bolster up that ability, the latter would, instead, be impaired if the importation were so made as to discourage our farmers from engaging in the production of rice.

                Besides, the stockpiling of rice and corn for purpose of national security and/or national emergency is within the purview of Republic Act No. 3452. Section 3 thereof expressly authorizes the Rice and Corn Administration “to accumulate stocks as a national reserve in such quantities as it may deem proper and necessary to meet any contingencies”. Moreover, it ordains that “the buffer stocks held as a national reserve ... be deposited by the administration throughout the country under the proper dispersal plans ... and may be released only upon the occurrence of calamities or emergencies ...”.

Ichong v. Hernandez

Ichong v. Hernandez

G.R. No. L-7995 May 31, 1957

Labrador, J.

Doctrines:

                Police power is so far-reaching in scope, that it has become almost impossible to limit its sweep. As it derives its existence from the very existence of the State itself, it does not need to be expressed or defined in its scope; it is said to be co-extensive with self-protection and survival, and as such it is the most positive and active of all governmental processes, the most essential, insistent and illimitable. Especially is it so under a modern democratic framework where the demands of society and of nations have multiplied to almost unimaginable proportions; the field and scope of police power has become almost boundless, just as the fields of public interest and public welfare have become almost all-embracing and have transcended human foresight. Otherwise stated, as we cannot foresee the needs and demands of public interest and welfare in this constantly changing and progressive world, so we cannot delimit beforehand the extent or scope of police power by which and through which the State seeks to attain or achieve interest or welfare. So it is that Constitutions do not define the scope or extent of the police power of the State; what they do is to set forth the limitations thereof. The most important of these are the due process clause and the equal protection clause.

                The basic limitations of due process and equal protection are found in the following provisions of our Constitution:

SECTION 1.(1) No person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property without due process of law, nor any person be denied the equal protection of the laws. (Article III, Phil. Constitution)

These constitutional guarantees which embody the essence of individual liberty and freedom in democracies, are not limited to citizens alone but are admittedly universal in their application, without regard to any differences of race, of color, or of nationality.

* * * * *

          The equal protection of the law clause is against undue favor and individual or class privilege, as well as hostile discrimination or the oppression of inequality. It is not intended to prohibit legislation, which is limited either in the object to which it is directed or by territory within which is to operate. It does not demand absolute equality among residents; it merely requires that all persons shall be treated alike, under like circumstances and conditions both as to privileges conferred and liabilities enforced. The equal protection clause is not infringed by legislation which applies only to those persons falling within a specified class, if it applies alike to all persons within such class, and reasonable grounds exists for making a distinction between those who fall within such class and those who do not.

* * * * *

          The due process clause has to do with the reasonableness of legislation enacted in pursuance of the police power. Is there public interest, a public purpose; is public welfare involved? Is the Act reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of the legislature’s purpose; is it not unreasonable, arbitrary or oppressive? Is there sufficient foundation or reason in connection with the matter involved; or has there not been a capricious use of the legislative power? Can the aims conceived be achieved by the means used, or is it not merely an unjustified interference with private interest? These are the questions that we ask when the due process test is applied.

The conflict, therefore, between police power and the guarantees of due process and equal protection of the laws is more apparent than real. Properly related, the power and the guarantees are supposed to coexist. The balancing is the essence or, shall it be said, the indispensable means for the attainment of legitimate aspirations of any democratic society. There can be no absolute power, whoever exercise it, for that would be tyranny. Yet there can neither be absolute liberty, for that would mean license and anarchy. So the State can deprive persons of life, liberty and property, provided there is due process of law; and persons may be classified into classes and groups, provided everyone is given the equal protection of the law. The test or standard, as always, is reason. The police power legislation must be firmly grounded on public interest and welfare, and a reasonable relation must exist between purposes and means. And if distinction and classification has been made, there must be a reasonable basis for said distinction.

         Due process is a limitation on the exercise of the police power. The guaranty of due process demands only that the law shall not be unreasonable, arbitrary or capricious, and that the means selected shall have a real and substantial relation to the subject sought to be attained.

               

To justify the state in thus interposing its authority in behalf of the public, it must appear, first, that the interests of the public generally, as distinguished from those of a particular class, require such interference; and second, that the means are reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of the purpose, and not unduly oppressive upon individuals

Agustin v. Edu

Agustin v. Edu

G.R. No. L-49112 February 2, 1979

Fernando, J.

Issue:

                whether Letter of Instruction No. 229, as amended, was validly issued in the exercise of police power

Held:

                The Letter of Instruction in question was issued in the exercise of the police power. Police power is nothing more or less than the powers of government inherent in every sovereignty. It is identified with state authority to enact legislation that may interfere with personal liberty or property in order to promote the general welfare. Persons and property could thus be subjected to all kinds of restraints and burdens in order to promote the general comfort, health and prosperity of the state. Police power is the power to prescribe regulations to promote the health, morals, peace, education, good order or safety, and general welfare of the people. It is that inherent and plenary power in the State which enables it to prohibit all things hurtful to the comfort, safety and welfare of society. It is the most essential, insistent, and at least table powers, extending to all the great public needs.

                To avoid the taint of unlawful delegation, there must be a standard, which implies at the very least that the legislature itself determines matters of principle and lays down fundamental policy. A standard thus defines legislative policy, marks its maps out its boundaries and specifies the public agency to apply it. It indicates the circumstances under which the legislative command is to be effected. It is the criterion by which legislative purpose may be carried out. Thereafter, the executive or administrative office designated may in pursuance of the above guidelines promulgate supplemental rules and regulations. The standard may be either express or implied. If the former, the non-delegation objection is easily met. The standard though does not have to be spelled out specifically. It could be implied from the policy and purpose of the act considered as a whole. The principle of non-delegation “has been made to adapt itself to the complexities of modern governments, giving rise to the adoption, within certain limits, of the principle of “subordinate legislation” not only in the United States and England but in practically all modern governments. Accordingly, with the growing complexity of modern life, the multiplication of the subjects of governmental regulation, and the increased difficulty of administering the laws, there is a constantly growing tendency toward the delegation of greater powers by the legislature and toward the approval of the practice by the courts. Consistency with the conceptual approach requires the reminder that what is delegated is authority non-legislative in character, the completeness of the statute when it leaves the hands of Congress being assumed.