Llamas v. Orbos

Llamas v. Orbos

G.R. No. 99031 October 15, 1991

Paras, J.

Facts:

                Petitioner Rodolfo D. Llamas is the incumbent Vice-Governor of the Province of Tarlac and, on March 1, 1991 he assumed, by virtue of a decision of the Office of the President, the governorship (p. 1, Petition). Private respondent Mariano Un Ocampo III is the incumbent Governor of the Province of Tarlac and was suspended from office for a period of 90 days. Public respondent Oscar Orbos was the Executive Secretary at the time of the filing of this petition and is being impleaded herein in that official capacity for having issued, by authority of the President, the assailed Resolution granting executive clemency to respondent governor.

Sometime in 1989, petiotioner, together with Tarlac Board Members Marcelino Aganon, Jr. and Arnaldo P. Dizon, filed on June 13, 1989 a verified complaint dated June 7, 1989 against respondent governor before the then Department of Local Government (DLG, for short), charging him with alleged violation of Section 203(2) (f) 203(2) (p), and 208(w), of Batas Pambansa (B.P.) Blg. 337, otherwise known as the Local Government Code, and other appropriate laws, among them, the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act. Prior to that, petitioner filed with the Office of the Omdusman a verified complainant dated November 10, 1988 against respondent governor for the latter’s alleged violation of Section 3-G of Republic Act. (R.A.) No. 3019, otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act.

The complaint before the DLG was subsequently tried, where both petitioner and respondent govemor presented their respective evidence. The Secretary of the then Department of Local Government rendered a decision finding Gov. Mariano Un Ocampo III guilty of having violated Section 3(g) of Republic Act No.3019, otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, which act amounts to serious neglect of duty and/or abuse of authority.

Subsequently, and pursuant to Sec. 66, Chapter 4 of B.P. Blg. 337, to the effect that the decision of the Office of the President in administrative suspension of local officials shall be immediately executory without prejudice to appeal to appropriate courts, petitioner, on March 1, 1991, took his oath of office as acting governor. Under the administrative suspension order, petitioner had up to May 31, 1991 as acting governor. On the same date (March 1, 1991), respondent govemor moved for a reconsideration of the Executive Secretary’s Resolution, to which petitioner filed an opposition. From the allegations of the petitioner in his petition, respondent govemor accepted his suspension and turned over his office to petitioner.

Petitioner’s main argument is that the President may grant executive clemency only in criminal cases, based on Article VII, Section 19 of the Constitution which reads:

Sec. 19. Except in cases of impeachment, or as otherwise pro vided in this Constitution, the President may grant reprieves, commutations, and pardons, and remit fines and forfeitures, after conviction by final judgment.

He shall also have the power to grant amnesty with the concurrence of a majority of all the members of the Congress. (Emphasis supplied)

Issue:

                whether or not the President of the Philippines has the power to grant executive clemency in administrative cases

Held:

                The Constitution does not distinguish between which cases executive clemency may be exercised by the President, with the sole exclusion of impeachment cases. By the same token, if executive clemency may be exercised only in criminal cases, it would indeed be unnecessary to provide for the exclusion of impeachment cases from the coverage of Article VII, Section 19 of the Constitution. Following petitioner’s proposed interpretation, cases of impeachment are automatically excluded inasmuch as the same do not necessarily involve criminal offenses. (When we say the President can grant executive clemency in administrative cases, We refer only to all administrative cases in the Executive branch, not in the Judicial or Legislative branches of the government.)

The President’s executive clemency powers may not be limited in terms of coverage, except as already provided in the Constitution, that is, “no pardon, amnesty, parole, or suspension of sentence for violation of election laws, rules and regulations shall be granted by the President without the favorable recommendation of the COMELEC” (Article IX, C, Section 5, Constitution). If those already adjudged guilty criminally in court may be pardoned, those adjudged guilty administratively should likewise be extended the same benefit.

                The disciplinary authority to investigate, suspend, and remove provincial or city officials devolves at the first instance on the Department of Interior and Local Government (Secs. 61 and 65, B.P. Blg. 337) and ultimately on the President (Sec. 66). Implicit in this authority, however, is the “supervision and control” power of the President to reduce, if circumstances so warrant, the imposable penalty or to modify the suspension or removal order, even “in the sense” of granting executive clemency. “Control,” within the meaning of the Constitution, is the power to substitute one’s own judgment for that of a subordinate. Under the doctrine of Qualified Political Agency, the different executive departments are mere adjuncts of the President. Their acts are presumptively the acts of the President until countermanded or reprobated by her. Replying upon this view, it is urged by the Solicitor General that in the present case, the President, in the exercise of her power of supervision and control over all executive departments, may substitute her decision for that of her subordinate, most especially where the basis therefor would be to serve the greater public interest. It is clearly within the power of the President not only to grant “executive clemency” but also to reverse or modify a ruling issued by a subordinate against an erring public official, where a reconsideration of the facts alleged would support the same.