Olaguer v. Military Commission No. 34

Olaguer v. Military Commission No. 34

G.R. No. L-54558 May 22, 1987

Gancayco, J.

Facts:

                On December 24, 1979, the herein petitioners Eduardo B. Olaguer, Othoniel V. Jimenez, Ester Misa-Jimenez, Carlos Lazaro, Reynaldo Maclang, Magdalena De Los Santos Maclang, Teodorico N. Diesmos, Rene J. Marciano, Danilo R. De Ocampo and Victoriano C. Amado were arrested by the military authorities. They were all initially detained at Camp Crame in Quezon City. They were subsequently transferred to the detention center at Camp Bagong Diwa in Bicutan except for petitioner Olaguer who remained in detention at Camp Crame. Petitioner Mac Aceron voluntarily surrendered to the authorities sometime in June, 1980 and was, thereafter, also incarcerated at Camp Bagong Diwa. All of the petitioners are civilians.

On May 30, 1980, the petitioners were charged for subversion upon the recommendation of the respondent Judge Advocate General and the approval of the respondent Minister of National Defense. The case was designated as Criminal Case No. MC-34-1.

On June 13. 1980, the respondent Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces of the Philippines created the respondent Military Commission No 34 to try tile criminal case filed against the petitioners. On July 30, 1980, an amended charge sheet was filed for seven (7) offenses, namely: (1) unlawful possession of explosives and incendiary devices; (2) conspiracy to assassinate President, and Mrs. Marcos; (3) conspiracy to assassinate cabinet members Juan Ponce Enrile, Francisco Tatad and Vicente Paterno; (4) conspiracy to assassinate Messrs. Arturo Tangco, Jose Roño and Onofre Corpus; (5) arson of nine buildings; (6) attempted murder of Messrs. Leonardo Perez, Teodoro Valencia and Generals Romeo Espino and Fabian Ver; and (7) conspiracy and proposal to commit rebellion, and inciting to rebellion. Sometime thereafter, trial ensued.

In the course of the proceedings, particularly on August 19, 1980, the petitioners went to the Supreme Court and filed the instant Petition for prohibition and habeas corpus.” They sought to enjoin the respondent Military Commission No. 34 from proceeding with the trial of their case. They likewise sought their release from detention by way of a writ of habeas corpus. The thrust of their arguments is that military commissions have no jurisdiction to try civilians for offenses alleged to have been committed during the period of martial law. They also maintain that the proceedings before the respondent Military Commission No. 34 are in gross violation of their constitutional right to due process of law.

Issue:

                whether or not a military tribunal has the jurisdiction to try civilians while the civil courts are open and functioning

Held:

                No. Military commissions or tribunals have no jurisdiction to try civilians for alleged offenses when the civil courts are open and functioning.

                Due process of law demands that in all criminal prosecutions (where the accused stands to lose either his life or his liberty), the accused shall be entitled to, among others, a trial. The trial contemplated by the due process clause of the Constitution, in relation to the Charter as a whole, is a trial by judicial process, not by executive or military process. Military commissions or tribunals, by whatever name they are called, are not courts within the Philippine judicial system.

Judicial power is vested by the Constitution exclusively in the Supreme Court and in such inferior courts as are duly established by law. Judicial power exists only in the courts, which have “exclusive power to hear and determine those matters which affect the life or liberty or property of a citizen.

Since we are not enemy-occupied territory nor are we under a military government and even on the premise that martial law continues in force, the military tribunals cannot try and exercise jurisdiction over civilians for civil offenses committed by them which are properly cognizable by the civil courts that have remained open and have been regularly functioning.

Moreover, military tribunals pertain to the Executive Department of the Government and are simply instrumentalities of the executive power, provided by the legislature for the President as Commander-in-Chief to aid him in properly commanding the army and navy and enforcing discipline therein, and utilized under his orders or those of his authorized military representatives. Following the principle of separation of powers underlying the existing constitutional organization of the Government of the Philippines, the power and the duty of interpreting the laws as when an individual should be considered to have violated the law) is primarily a function of the judiciary. It is not, and it cannot be the function of the Executive Department, through the military authorities. And as long as the civil courts in the land remain open and are regularly functioning, as they do so today and as they did during the period of martial law in the country, military tribunals cannot try and exercise jurisdiction over civilians for offenses committed by them and which are properly cognizable by the civil courts. To have it otherwise would be a violation of the constitutional right to due process of the civilian concerned.

As long as the civil courts in the land are open and functioning, military tribunals cannot try and exercise jurisdiction over civilians for offenses committed by them. Whether or not martial law has been proclaimed throughout the country or over a part thereof is of no moment. The imprimatur for this observation is found in Section 18, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution, to wit —

A state of martial law, does not suspend the operation of the Constitution, nor supplant the functioning of the civil courts or legislative assemblies, nor authorize the conferment of jurisdiction on military courts and agencies over civilians where civil courts are able to function, nor automatically suspend the privilege of the writ.