Tan v. Del Rosario

Tan v. Del Rosario

Vitug, J.

G.R. No. 109289 October 3, 1994

Facts:

                These two consolidated special civil actions for prohibition challenge, in G.R. No. 109289, the constitutionality of Republic Act No. 7496, also commonly known as the Simplified Net Income Taxationn Scheme (“SNIT”), amending certain provisions of the National Internal Revenue Regulations No. 293, promulgated by public respondents pursuant to said law. It is asserted that the enactment of Republic Act No. 7496 violates Article VI, Sec. 26(1) of the Constitution which provides that “[e]very bill passed by the Congress shall embrace only one subject which shall be expressed in the title thereof”.

Issue:

                Is Republic Act No. 7496 a misnomer or, at least, deficient for being merely entitled, “Simplified Net Income Taxation Scheme for the Self-Employed and Professionals Engaged in the Practice of their Profession”?

Held:

                No. It would be difficult to accept petitioner’s view that the amendatory law should be considered as having now adopted a gross income, instead of as having still retained the net income, taxation scheme. The allowance for deductible items, it is true, may have significantly been reduced by the questioned law in comparison with that which has prevailed prior to the amendment; limiting, however, allowable deductions from gross income is neither discordant with, nor opposed to, the net income tax concept. The fact of the matter is still that various deductions, which are by no means inconsequential, continue to be well provided under the new law.

Article VI, Section 26(1), of the Constitution has been envisioned so as (a) to prevent log-rolling legislation intended to unite the members of the legislature who favor any one of unrelated subjects in support of the whole act, (b) to avoid surprises or even fraud upon the legislature, and (c) to fairly apprise the people, through such publications of its proceedings as are usually made, of the subjects of legislation. The above objectives of the fundamental law appear to us to have been sufficiently met. Anything else would be to require a virtual compendium of the law which could not have been the intendment of the constitutional mandate.