Sarmiento v. Mison
G.R. No.
79974 December 17, 1987
Padilla,
J.
Facts:
In this petition for prohibition,
the petitioners, who are taxpayers, lawyers, members of the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines and professors of Constitutional Law, seek to enjoin the respondent
Salvador Mison from performing the functions of the Office of Commissioner of the
Bureau of Customs and the respondent Guillermo Carague, as Secretary of the Department
of Budget, from effecting disbursements in payment of Mison’s salaries and emoluments,
on the ground that Mison’s appointment as Commissioner of the Bureau of Customs
is unconstitutional by reason of its not having been confirmed by the Commission
on Appointments. The respondents, on the other hand, maintain the constitutionality
of respondent Mison’s appointment without the confirmation of the Commission on
Appointments.
Issue:
whether or not appointment as Commissioner
of Customs requires conformation by the Commission on Appointments
Held:
No.
Section 16, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution
says:
The President shall nominate and, with the
consent of the Commission on Appointments, appoint the heads of the executive departments,
ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls, or officers of the armed forces
from the rank of colonel or naval captain, and other officers whose appointments
are vested in him in this Constitution. He shall also appoint all other officers
of the Government whose appointments are not otherwise provided for by law, and
those whom he may be authorized by law to appoint. The Congress may, by law, vest
the appointment of other officers lower in rank in the President alone, in the courts,
or in the heads of the departments, agencies, commissions or boards.
The President shall have the power to make
appointments during the recess of the Congress, whether voluntary or compulsory,
but such appointments shall be effective only until disapproval by the Commission
on Appointments or until the next adjournment of the Congress.
It is readily apparent
that under the provisions of the 1987 Constitution, just quoted, there are four
(4) groups of officers whom the President shall appoint. These four (4) groups,
to which we will hereafter refer from time to time, are:
First, the heads of the executive departments,
ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls, officers of the armed forces from
the rank of colonel or naval captain, and other officers whose appointments are
vested in him in this Constitution;
Second, all other officers of the Government whose
appointments are not otherwise provided for by law;
Third, those whom the President may be authorized
by law to appoint;
Fourth, officers lower in rank whose appointments the Congress may by law vest
in the President alone.
The
first group of officers is clearly appointed with the consent of the Commission
on Appointments. Appointments of such officers are initiated by nomination and,
if the nomination is confirmed by the Commission on Appointments, the President
appoints.
The second, third and fourth
groups of officers are the present bone of contention. Should they be appointed
by the President with or without the consent (confirmation) of the Commission on
Appointments?
As a result
of the innovations introduced in Sec. 16, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution,
there are officers whose appointments require no confirmation of the Commission
on Appointments, even if such officers may be higher in rank, compared to some officers
whose appointments have to be confirmed by the Commission on Appointments under
the first sentence of the same Sec. 16, Art. VII. Thus, to illustrate, the appointment
of the Central Bank Governor requires no confirmation by the Commission on Appointments,
even if he is higher in rank than a colonel in the Armed Forces of the Philippines
or a consul in the Consular Service.
In the 1987 Constitution,
however, the clear and expressed intent of its framers was to exclude presidential
appointments from confirmation by the Commission on Appointments, except appointments
to offices expressly mentioned in the first sentence of Sec. 16, Article VII. Consequently,
there was no reason to use in the third sentence of Sec. 16, Article VII the word
“alone” after the word “President” in providing that Congress may by law vest the
appointment of lower-ranked officers in the President alone, or in the courts, or
in the heads of departments, because the power to appoint officers whom he (the
President) may be authorized by law to appoint is already vested in the President, without need of confirmation by the Commission
on Appointments, in the second sentence of the same Sec. 16, Article VII.
Therefore, the third sentence
of Sec. 16, Article VII could have stated merely that, in the case of lower-ranked
officers, the Congress may by law vest their appointment in the President, in the
courts, or in the heads of various departments of the government. In short, the
word “alone” in the third sentence of Sec. 16, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution,
as a literal import from the last part of par. 3, section 10, Article VII of the
1935 Constitution, appears to be redundant in the light of the second sentence of
Sec. 16, Article VII. And, this redundancy cannot prevail over the clear and positive
intent of the framers of the 1987 Constitution that presidential appointments, except
those mentioned in the first sentence of Sec. 16, Article VII, are not subject to
confirmation by the Commission on Appointments.
The position of Commissioner
of the Bureau of Customs (a bureau head) is not one of those within the first group
of appointments where the consent of the Commission on Appointments is required.
As a matter of fact, as already pointed out, while the 1935 Constitution includes
“heads of bureaus” among those officers whose appointments need the consent of the
Commission on Appointments, the 1987 Constitution on the other hand, deliberately
excluded the position of “heads of bureaus” from appointments that need the consent
(confirmation) of the Commission on Appointments.
Moreover, the President
is expressly authorized by law to appoint the Commissioner of the Bureau of Customs.
The original text of Sec. 601 of Republic Act No. 1937, otherwise known as the Tariff
and Customs Code of the Philippines, which was enacted by the Congress of the Philippines
on 22 June 1957, reads as follows:
601. Chief Officials of the Bureau.-The
Bureau of Customs shall have one chief and one assistant chief, to be known respectively
as the Commissioner (hereinafter known as the ‘Commissioner’) and Assistant Commissioner
of Customs, who shall each receive an annual compensation in accordance with the
rates prescribed by existing laws. The Assistant Commissioner of Customs shall be
appointed by the proper department head.
Sec. 601 of Republic Act
No. 1937, was amended on 27 October 1972 by Presidential Decree No. 34, amending
the Tariff and Customs Code of the Philippines. Sec. 601, as thus amended, now reads
as follows:
Sec. 601. Chief Officials of the Bureau
of Customs.-The Bureau of Customs shall have one chief and one assistant chief,
to be known respectively as the Commissioner (hereinafter known as Commissioner)
and Deputy Commissioner of Customs, who shall each receive an annual compensation
in accordance with the rates prescribed by existing law. The Commissioner and the Deputy Commissioner
of Customs shall be appointed by the President of the Philippines (Emphasis supplied.)
Of course, these laws (Rep.
Act No. 1937 and PD No. 34) were approved during the effectivity of the 1935 Constitution,
under which the President may nominate and, with the consent of the Commission on
Appointments, appoint the heads of bureaus, like the Commissioner of the Bureau
of Customs.
After the
effectivity of the 1987 Constitution, however, Rep. Act No. 1937 and PD No. 34 have
to be read in harmony with Sec. 16, Art. VII, with the result that, while the appointment
of the Commissioner of the Bureau of Customs is one that devolves on the President,
as an appointment he is authorized by law to make, such appointment, however, no
longer needs the confirmation of the Commission on Appointments.
Sec. 261. Prohibited Acts. — The following
shall be guilty of an election offense:
(a) Vote-buying and vote-selling. — (1)
Any person who gives, offer or promises money or anything of value gives or promises any office or employment,
franchise or grant, public or private, or makes or offers to make an expenditure,
directly or indirectly, or cause an expenditure to be made to any person, association,
corporation, entity, or community in
order to induce anyone or the public in general to vote for or against any candidate
or withhold his vote in the election, or to vote for or against any aspirant
for the nomination or choice of
a candidate in a convention or similar selection process of a political party.
xxx xxx xxx
(g) Appointment of new employees, creation
of new position, promotion, or giving salary increases. — During the period of forty-five
days before a regular election and thirty days before a regular election and thirty
days before a special election, (1) any head, official or appointing officer of
a government office, agency or instrumentality, whether national or local, including
government-owned or controlled corporations, who
appoints or hires any new employee, whether provisional,
temporary, or casual, or creates and fills any new position, except upon prior authority
of the Commission. The Commission shall not grant the authority sought unless, it
is satisfied that the position to be filled is essential to the proper functioning
of the office or agency concerned, and that the position shall not be filled in
a manner that may influence the election.
The
second type of appointments prohibited by Section 15, Article VII consist of the
so-called “midnight” appointments. There
may well be appointments to important positions which have to be made even after
the proclamations of a new President. Such appointments, so long as they are “few
and so spaced as to afford some assurance of deliberate action and careful consideration
of the need for the appointment and the appointee’s qualifications,” can be made by the outgoing
President.
Section 15 may not unreasonably be deemed to contemplate
not only “midnight” appointments — those made obviously for partisan reasons as
shown by their number and the time of their making — but also appointments of the
Presidential election.
The exception in the same
Section 15 of Article VII allows only the making of temporary appointments to executive positions when continued vacancies will prejudice public service or endanger
public safety. Obviously, the article greatly restricts the appointing power
of the President during the period of the ban.
Considering the respective
reasons for the time frames for filling vacancies in the courts and the restriction
on the President’s power of appointments, it is the Supreme Court’s view that, as a general proposition, in case of conflict, the
former should yield to the latter. Surely, the prevention of vote-buying and similar
evils outweighs the need for avoiding delays in filling up of court vacancies or
the disposition of some cases. Temporary vacancies can abide the period of the ban
which, incidentally and as earlier pointed out, comes to exist only once in every
six years. Moreover, those occurring in the lower courts can be filled temporarily
by designation. But prohibited appointments are long-lasting and permanent in their
effects. They may, as earlier pointed out, their making is considered an election
offense.
To be sure, instances may be conceived of the imperative need
for an appointment, during the period of the ban, not only in the executive but
also in the Supreme Court. This may be the case should the membership of the Court
be so reduced that it will have no quorum, or should the voting on a particularly
important question requiring expeditious resolution be evenly divided. Such a case,
however, is covered by neither Section 15 of Article VII nor Sections 4 (1) and
9 of Article VIII.
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