Ruffy v. Chief of Staff

Ruffy v. Chief of Staff

G.R. No. L-45081 July 15, 1936

Tuason, J.

Facts:

                This was a petition for prohibition, praying that the respondents, the Chief of Staff and the General Court Martial of the Philippine Army, be commanded to desist from further proceedings in the trial of petitioners before that body. Preliminary injunction having been denied by us and the General Court Martial having gone ahead with the trial, which eventually resulted in the acquittal of one of the defendants, Ramon Ruffy, the dismissal of the case as to another, Victoriano Dinglasan, and the conviction of Jose L. Garcia, Prudente M. Francisco, Dominador Adeva and Andres Fortus, the last-named four petitioners now seek in their memorandum to convert the petition into one for certiorari, with the prayer that the records of the proceedings before the General Court Martial be ordered certified to the Supreme Court for review.

The ground of the petition was that the petitioners were not subject to military law at the time the offense for which they had been placed on trial was committed. In their memorandum they have raised an additional question of law — that the 93d Article of War is unconstitutional.

Issue:

                whether petitioners were not subject to military law at the time the offense for which they had been placed on trial was committed

Held:

                No. The 2d Article of War defines and enumerates the persons subject to military law as follows:

Art. 2. Persons Subject to Military Law. — The following persons are subject to these articles and shall be understood as included in the term “any person subject to military law” or “persons subject to military law,” whenever used in these articles:

(a)          All officers, members of the Nurse Corps and soldiers belonging to the Regular Force of the Philippine Army; all reservists, from the dates of their call to active duty and while on such active duty; all trainees undergoing military instructions; and all other persons lawfully called, drafted, or order to obey the same;

(b)          Cadets, flying cadets, and probationary third lieutenants;

(c)           All retainers to the camp and all persons accompanying or serving with the Army of the Philippines in the field in time of war or when martial law is declared though not otherwise subject to these articles;

(d)         All persons under sentences adjudged by courts-martial.

The petitioners come within the general application of the clause in sub-paragraph (a); “and all other persons lawfully called, drafted, or ordered into, or to duty for training in, the said service, from the dates they are required by the terms of the call, draft, or order to obey the same.” By their acceptance of appointments as officers in the Bolo Area from the General Headquarters of the 6th Military District, they became members of the Philippine Army amendable to the Articles of War. The Bolo Area, as has been seen, was a contingent of the 6th Military District which, as has also been pointed out, had been recognized by and placed under the operational control of the United States Army in the Southwest Pacific. The Bolo Area received supplies and funds for the salaries of its officers and men from the Southwest Pacific Command. As officers in the Bolo Area and the 6th Military District, the petitioners operated under the orders of duly established and duly appointed commanders of the United States Army.

Issue:

                whether the 93d Article of War is unconstitutional as it deprives the Supreme Court of its jurisdiction over offenses punishable by death or imprisonment for life

Held:

                No. Courts martial are agencies of executive character, and one of the authorities for the ordering of courts martial has been held to be attached to the constitutional functions of the President as Commander in Chief, independently of legislation. Unlike courts of law, they are not a portion of the judiciary. Congress has the power to provide for the trial and punishment of military and naval offenses in the manner then and now practiced by civilized nations.

                Not belonging to the judicial branch of the government, it follows that courts-martial must pertain to the executive department; and they are in fact simply instrumentalities of the executive power, provided by Congress for the President as Commander in Chief, to aid him in properly commanding the army and navy and enforcing discipline therein, and utilized under his orders or those of his authorized military representatives.