Quintos-Deles v. Commission on Constitutional Commissions (CA)

Quintos-Deles v. Commission on Constitutional Commissions (CA)

G.R. No. 83216 September 4, 1989

Bidin, J.

Facts:

                This is a special civil action for prohibition and mandamus with injunction seeking to compel respondent Commission on Appointments to allow petitioner Teresita Quintos-Deles to perform and discharge her duties as a member of the House of Representatives representing the Women’s Sector and to restrain respondents from subjecting petitioner’s appointment to the confirmation process.

                The Constitution provides that the House of Representatives shall be composed of not more than two hundred fifty (250) members, unless otherwise fixed by law, who shall be elected from the legislative districts and those who as provided by law, shall be elected thru a party-list system. The party-list representatives shall constitute 20% of the total number of representatives or fifty (50) seats. One-half or twenty-five (25) of the seats allocated to party-list representatives is reserved for sectoral representatives. The reservation is limited to three consecutive terms after ratification of the 1987 Constitution. Thus, Section 5 (1) and (2), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution provides:

SEC. 5. (1) The House of Representatives shall be composed of not more than two hundred and fifty members, unless otherwise fixed by law, who shall be elected from legislative districts apportioned among the provinces, cities, and the Metropolitan Manila area in accordance with the number of their respective inhabitants, and on the basis of a uniform and progressive ratio, and those who, as provided by law, shall be elected through a party-list system of registered national, regional, and sectoral parties or organizations.

(2) The party-list representatives shall constitute twenty per centum of the total number of representatives including those under the party-list. For three consecutive terms after the ratification of this Constitution, one-half of the seats allocated to party-list representatives shall be filled, as provided by law, by selection or election from the labor, peasant, urban poor, indigenous cultural communities, women, youth, and such other sectors as may be provided by law, except the religious sector.

                Under Section 7, Article XVIII of the Constitution, the appointment of sectoral representatives is vested upon the President until otherwise provided by law, as follows:

SEC. 7. Until a law is passed, the President may fill by appointment from a list of nominees by the respective sectors the seats reserved for sectoral representation in paragraph (1), Section 5 of Article VI of this Constitution.

Issue:

                whether the Constitution requires the appointment of sectoral representatives to the House of Representatives to be confirmed by the Commission on Appointments

Held:

                Yes. Section 16, Article VII of the Constitution enumerates among others, the officers who may be appointed by the President with the consent of the Commission on Appointments, as follows:

SEC. 16. The President shall nominate and, with the consent of the Commission on Appointments, appoint the heads of the executive departments, ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls or officers of the armed forces from the rank of colonel or naval captain, and other officers whose appointments are vested in him in this Constitution. He shall also appoint all other officers of the Government whose appointments are not otherwise provided for by law, and those whom he may be authorized by law to appoint. The Congress may, by law, vest the appointment of other officers lower in rank in the President alone, in the courts, or in the heads of departments, agencies, commissions, or boards.

The President shall have the power to make appointments during the recess of the Congress, whether voluntary or compulsory, but such appointments shall be effective only until disapproval by the Commission on Appointments or until the next adjournment of the Congress.

In Sarmiento vs. Mison, et al., the Supreme Court construed Section 16, Article VII of the Constitution to mean that only appointments to offices mentioned in the first sentence of the said Section 16, Article VII require confirmation by the Commission on Appointments, as follows:

It is readily apparent that under the provisions of the 1987 Constitution, just quoted, there are four (4) groups of officers whom the President shall appoint. These four (4) groups, to which we will hereafter refer from time to time, are:

First, the heads of the executive departments, ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls officers of the armed forces from the rank of colonel or naval captain, and other officers whose appointments are vested in him in this Constitution;

Second, all other officers of the Government whose appointments are not otherwise provided for by law;

Third, those whom the President may be authorized by law to appoint;

Fourth, officers lower in rank whose appointments the Congress may by law vest in the President alone.

The first group of officers is clearly appointed with the consent of the Commission on Appointments. Appointments of such officers are initiated by nomination and, if the nomination is confirmed by the Commission on Appointments, the President appoints.

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(T)he purposive intention and deliberate judgment of the framers of the 1987 Constitution (is) that, except as to those officers whose appointments require the consent of the Commission on Appointments by express mandate of the first sentence in Sec. 16, Art. VII, appointments of other officers are left to the President without need of confirmation by the Commission on Appointments.

Since the seats reserved for sectoral representatives in paragraph 2, Section 5, Art. VI may be filled by appointment by the President by express provision of Section 7, Art. XVIII of the Constitution, it is indubitable that sectoral representatives to the House of Representatives are among the “other officers whose appointments are vested in the President in this Constitution,” referred to in the first sentence of Section 16, Art. VII whose appointments are subject to confirmation by the Commission on Appointments.

Nevertheless, there are appointments vested in the President in the Constitution which, by express mandate of the Constitution, require no confirmation such as appointments of members of the Supreme Court and judges of lower courts (Sec. 9, Art. VIII) and the Ombudsman and his deputies (Sec. 9, Art. XI). No such exemption from confirmation had been extended to appointments of sectoral representatives in the Constitution. Petitioner was appointed on April 6, 1988 pursuant to Art. XVIII, Section 7 and Art. VII, Section 16, paragraph 2 of the Constitution.

The invocation of Art. XVIII, Section 7 of the Constitution as authority for the appointment of petitioner places said appointment within the ambit of the first sentence of Section 16, Art. VII; hence, subject to confirmation by the Commission on Appointments under the Mison doctrine. Petitioner’s appointment was furthermore made pursuant to Art. VII, Section 16, paragraph 2 which provides:

SEC. 16. ...

The President shall have the power to make appointments during the recess of the Congress, whether voluntary or compulsory, but such appointments shall be effective only until disapproval by the Commission on Appointments or until the next adjournment of the Congress.

The reference to paragraph 2, Section 16 of Article VII as additional authority for the appointment of petitioner is of vital significance to the case at bar. The records show that petitioner’s appointment was made on April 6, 1988 or while Congress was in recess (March 26, 1988 to April 17, 1988); hence, the reference to the said paragraph 2 of Section 16, Art. VII in the appointment extended to her.

Implicit in the invocation of paragraph 2, Section 16, Art. VII as authority for the appointment of petitioner is, the recognition by the President as appointing authority that petitioner’s appointment requires confirmation by the Commission on Appointments. Under paragraph 2, Section 16, Art. VII, appointments made by the President pursuant thereto “shall be effective only until disapproval by the Commission on Appointments or until the next adjournment of the Congress.” If indeed appointments of sectoral representatives need no confirmation, the President need not make any reference to the constitutional provisions above-quoted in appointing the petitioner. Considering that Congress had adjourned without respondent Commission on Appointments having acted on petitioner’s appointment, said appointment/nomination had become moot and academic pursuant to Section 23 of the Rules of respondent Commission and “unless resubmitted shall not again be considered by the Commission.”

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(g) Appointment of new employees, creation of new position, promotion, or giving salary increases. — During the period of forty-five days before a regular election and thirty days before a regular election and thirty days before a special election, (1) any head, official or appointing officer of a government office, agency or instrumentality, whether national or local, including government-owned or controlled corporations, who appoints or hires any new employee, whether provisional, temporary, or casual, or creates and fills any new position, except upon prior authority of the Commission. The Commission shall not grant the authority sought unless, it is satisfied that the position to be filled is essential to the proper functioning of the office or agency concerned, and that the position shall not be filled in a manner that may influence the election.

The second type of appointments prohibited by Section 15, Article VII consist of the so-called “midnight” appointments. There may well be appointments to important positions which have to be made even after the proclamations of a new President. Such appointments, so long as they are “few and so spaced as to afford some assurance of deliberate action and careful consideration of the need for the appointment and the appointee’s qualifications,” ^can be made by the outgoing President.

                Section 15 may not unreasonably be deemed to contemplate not only “midnight” appointments — those made obviously for partisan reasons as shown by their number and the time of their making — but also appointments of the Presidential election.

The exception in the same Section 15 of Article VII allows only the making of temporary appointments to executive positions when continued vacancies will prejudice public service or endanger public safety. Obviously, the article greatly restricts the appointing power of the President during the period of the ban.

Considering the respective reasons for the time frames for filling vacancies in the courts and the restriction on the President’s power of appointments, it is the Supreme Court’s view that, as a general proposition, in case of conflict, the former should yield to the latter. Surely, the prevention of vote-buying and similar evils outweighs the need for avoiding delays in filling up of court vacancies or the disposition of some cases. Temporary vacancies can abide the period of the ban which, incidentally and as earlier pointed out, comes to exist only once in every six years. Moreover, those occurring in the lower courts can be filled temporarily by designation. But prohibited appointments are long-lasting and permanent in their effects. They may, as earlier pointed out, their making is considered an election offense.

To be sure, instances may be conceived of the imperative need for an appointment, during the period of the ban, not only in the executive but also in the Supreme Court. This may be the case should the membership of the Court be so reduced that it will have no quorum, or should the voting on a particularly important question requiring expeditious resolution be evenly divided. Such a case, however, is covered by neither Section 15 of Article VII nor Sections 4 (1) and 9 of Article VIII.