Prudential Bank v. Castro

Prudential Bank v. Castro

A.M. No. 2756 June 5, 1986

Per Curiam

Issue:

                whether or not respondent Judge must be disciplined for issuing an order in contravention of Section 14, Article VIII of the Constitution

Held:

                Yes. (a) In both original and amended Complaints in the RTC CASE, it was apparent that MACRO was suing for an amount of at least P50 million. On the very date of August 6, 1984, when the Amended Complaint was filed, which was only four days after the original Complaint was instituted, Respondent Judge was already aware, per his Order of attachment, that MACRO “in its verified complaint and affidavit”, was asking defendants “to pay the sum of P50,000,000.00 as actual and compensatory damages which plaintiff seeks to recover from defendant in this case.”

In the original and amended Complaints, the prayers did not ask for damages specifically in the sum of more than P50 million clearly in order to avoid payment of filing fees of more than P100,000.00. The filing fee actually paid was only P210.00.

Ordinarily, a Trial Judge may be excused from immediately noting a mistake made by the Clerk of Court in assessing filing fees. However, considering Respondent Judge’s realization of the mistake, on August 6, 1984, the date he issued his Order for preliminary attachment, and his actuations thereafter in the RTC CASE, his failure to require payment of the correct amount of filing fees indicated his partiality towards, not to say confabulation with, MACRO and/or its lawyers.

(b) The summary judgment was ill-conceived. For one thing, the Amended Complaint had charged Complainant Bank with fraud and deceit. Under the law, good faith is to be presumed, and the fraud and deceit imputed to Complainant Bank cannot be other than a question of fact, which should have been resolved after due reception of evidence pro and contra. There was nothing in the Answer, and in its pleadings in connection with MACRO’s Motion for summary judgment, which could indubitably be deemed an admission, or proof, of Complainant Bank’s alleged fraud and deceit. Respondent Judge’s statements to the contrary are bereft of veracity.

Worse errors have been committed by Trial Judges but, in the RTC CASE, the erroneous promulgation of the summary judgment indicates, in the light of the entire scenario, that the error was deliberate in order to favor plaintiff, or that it was in actual confabulation with plaintiff and its lawyers.

(c) The issuance of the summary judgment was bad enough. The grant therein of damages in the amount of more than P33 million, plus 20% attorney’s fees, when the property involved in the litigation was alleged in the amended complaint as.P20 million (sold to FALCONI for P6 million) immediately raises the thought that Respondent Judge had really taken a stand of partiality in favor of MACRO and its lawyers.

(d) The Order of January 7, 1985 of Respondent Judge also shows his partiality to, or his confabulation with MACRO and the latter’s lawyers.

The summary judgment was rendered on November 16, 1984, and notice thereof was served on Complainant Bank on November 26, 1984. The latter filed a Motion for Reconsideration on December 6, 1984. If, as Respondent Judge has ruled, the Motion for Reconsideration was pro forms the summary judgment became final on December 11, 1984. Respondent Judge, therefore, would no longer have authority to amend his Decision on January 7. 1985. When the Motion for Reconsideration was denied on February 7, 1985, Respondent Judge should also have set aside his Order of January 7, 1985 amending the summary judgment. It can now become clear that deferment of action on Complainant Bank’s Motion for Reconsideration was precisely for the purpose of allowing amendment of the Decision on January 7, 1985.

The Order of January 7, 1985 was set aside in G.R. No. 69907. It is now for us to state herein that Respondent Judge, in issuing such Order, clearly intended to favor MACRO by allowing it to sell, as it did sell, the MACRO property to FALCONI on January 14,1985.

(e) Respondent Judge, in his Order of March 13, 1985, gave course to the appeal of Complainant Bank although he had already ruled that the latter had lost the right of appeal. That Order of March 13, 1985 was issued after Complainant Bank had instituted G.R. No. 69907 on February 19, 1985, asking that Respondent Judge be ordered to allow its appeal from the summary judgment. The Order of March 13, 1985 was clearly intended to render G.R. No. 69907 moot and academic. Said Order was disrespectful of the Supreme Court. If at all, Respondent Judge should have come to the Supreme Court in said G.R. No. 69907, to ask for leave to allow the appeal of Complainant Bank with admission that he had realized that his previous denial of the appeal was erroneous. And it may be recalled that, in De Leon vs. Castro, 104 SCRA 241 (1981), the Supreme Court had occasion to state that Respondent’s Judge’s “submission of false certificates of service under Section 5 of the Judiciary Law is not excusable.”

                The Supreme Court decreed the dismissal of respondent Judge from the service.