Puyat v. De Guzman

Puyat v. De Guzman

G.R. No. L-51122 March 25, 1982

Melencio-Herrera, J.

Facts:

                This suit is poised against the Order of respondent Associate Commissioner of the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) granting Assemblyman Estanislao A. Fernandez leave to intervene in SEC Case No. 1747.

Issue:

                whether or not, in intervening in the SEC Case, Assemblyman Fernandez is, in effect, appearing as counsel, albeit indirectly, before an administrative body in contravention of the Constitutional provision

Held:

                Yes. Ordinarily, by virtue of the Motion for Intervention, Assemblyman Fernandez cannot be said to be appearing as counsel. Ostensibly, he is not appearing on behalf of another, although he is joining the cause of the private respondents. His appearance could theoretically be for the protection of his ownership of ten (10) shares of IPI in respect of the matter in litigation and not for the protection of the petitioners nor respondents who have their respective capable and respected counsel.

However, certain salient circumstances militate against the intervention of Assemblyman Fernandez in the SEC Case. He had acquired a mere P200.00 worth of stock in IPI, representing ten shares out of 262,843 outstanding shares. He acquired them “after the fact” that is, on May 30, 1979, after the contested election of Directors on May 14, 1979, after the quo warranto suit had been filed on May 25, 1979 before SEC and one day before the scheduled hearing of the case before the SEC on May 31, 1979. And what is more, before he moved to intervene, he had signified his intention to appear as counsel for respondent Eustaquio T. C. Acero, 2 but which was objected to by petitioners. Realizing, perhaps, the validity of the objection, he decided, instead, to “intervene” on the ground of legal interest in the matter under litigation. And it may be noted that in the case filed before the Rizal Court of First Instance, he appeared as counsel for defendant Excelsior, co-defendant of respondent Acero therein.

Under those facts and circumstances, there has been an indirect appearance as counsel before an administrative body and, that is a circumvention of the Constitutional prohibition. The “intervention” was an afterthought to enable him to appear actively in the proceedings in some other capacity. To believe the avowed purpose, that is, to enable him eventually to vote and to be elected as Director in the event of an unfavorable outcome of the SEC Case would be pure naiveté. He would still appear as counsel indirectly.