Rodriguez v. Gella

Rodriguez v. Gella

G.R. No. L-6266 February 2, 1953

Paras, C.J.

Issue:

                whether the emergency powers of the President delegated to him by the Legislature by virtue of the emergency Powers Act (C.A. No. 671) has ceased

Held:

                Section 26 of Article VI of the Constitution provides that “in times of war or other national emergency, the Congress may by law authorize the President, for a limited period and subject to such restrictions as it may prescribe, to promulgate rules and regulations to carry out a declared national policy.” Accordingly the National Assembly passed Commonwealth Act No. 671, declaring (in section 1) the national policy that “the existence of war between the United States and other countries of Europe and Asia, which involves the Philippines makes it necessary to invest the President with extraordinary powers in order to meet the resulting emergency,” and (in section 2) authorizing the President, “during the existence of the emergency, to promulgate such rules and regulations as he may deem necessary to carry out the national policy declared in section 1.”

As the Act was expressly in pursuance of the constitutional provision, it has to be assumed that the National Assembly intended it to be only for a limited period. If it be contended that the Act has not yet been duly repealed, and such step is necessary to a cessation of the emergency powers delegated to the President, the result would be obvious unconstitutionality, since it may never be repealed by the Congress, or if the latter ever attempts to do so, the President may wield his veto. This eventuality has in fact taken place when the President disapproved House Bill No. 727, repealing all Emergency Powers Acts. The situation will make the Congress and the President or either as the principal authority to determine the indefinite duration of the delegation of legislative powers, — in palpable repugnance to the constitutional provision that any grant thereunder must be for a limited period, necessarily to be fixed in the law itself and not dependent upon the arbitrary or elastic will of either the Congress or the President.

Although House Bill No. 727, had been vetoed by the President and did not thereby become a regular statute, it may at least be considered as a concurrent resolution of the Congress formally declaring the termination of the emergency powers. To contend that the Bill needed presidential acquiescence to produce effect, would lead to the anomalous, if not absurd, situation that, “while Congress might delegate its power by a simple majority, it might not be able to recall them except by two-third vote. In other words, it would be easier for Congress to delegate its powers than to take them back. This is not right and is not, and ought not to be the law.”

The powers lasted only during the emergency resulting from the last world war which factually involved the Philippines when Act No. 671 was passed on December 16, 1941. That emergency, which naturally terminated upon the ending of the last world war, was contemplated by the members of the National Assembly on the foresight that the actual state of war could prevent it from holding its next regular session. This is confirmed by the following statement of President Quezon: “When it became evident that we were completely helpless against air attack and that it was most unlikely the Philippine Legislature would hold its next regular session which was to open on January 1, 1942, the National Assembly passed into history approving a resolution which reaffirmed the abiding faith of the Filipino people in, and their loyalty to, the United States. The Assembly also enacted a law granting the President of the Philippines all the powers that under the Philippine Constitution may be delegated to him in time of war.” When President Quezon said “in time of war”, undoubtedly meant such factual war as that then raging.