US v. Ang Tang Ho

US v. Ang Tang Ho

G.R. No. 17122 February 27, 1922

Johns, J.

Issue:

                whether Act No. 2868 constitutes undue delegation of legislative power

Held:

                Yes. This question involves an analysis and construction of Act No. 2868, in so far as it authorizes the Governor-General to fix the price at which rice should be sold. It will be noted that section 1 authorizes the Governor-General, with the consent of the Council of State, for any cause resulting in an extraordinary rise in the price of palay, rice or corn, to issue and promulgate temporary rules and emergency measures for carrying out the purposes of the Act. By its very terms, the promulgation of temporary rules and emergency measures is left to the discretion of the Governor-General. The Legislature does not undertake to specify or define under what conditions or for what reasons the Governor-General shall issue the proclamation, but says that it may be issued “for any cause,” and leaves the question as to what is “any cause” to the discretion of the Governor-General. The Act also says: “For any cause, conditions arise resulting in an extraordinary rise in the price of palay, rice or corn.” The Legislature does not specify or define what is “an extraordinary rise.” That is also left to the discretion of the Governor-General. The Act also says that the Governor-General, “with the consent of the Council of State,” is authorized to issue and promulgate “temporary rules and emergency measures for carrying out the purposes of this Act.” It does not specify or define what is a temporary rule or an emergency measure, or how long such temporary rules or emergency measures shall remain in force and effect, or when they shall take effect. That is to say, the Legislature itself has not in any manner specified or defined any basis for the order, but has left it to the sole judgment and discretion of the Governor-General to say what is or what is not “a cause,” and what is or what is not “an extraordinary rise in the price of rice,” and as to what is a temporary rule or an emergency measure for the carrying out the purposes of the Act. Under this state of facts, if the law is valid and the Governor-General issues a proclamation fixing the minimum price at which rice should be sold, any dealer who, with or without notice, sells rice at a higher price, is a criminal. There may not have been any cause, and the price may not have been extraordinary, and there may not have been an emergency, but, if the Governor-General found the existence of such facts and issued a proclamation, and rice is sold at any higher price, the seller commits a crime.

                A law must be complete, in all its terms and provisions, when it leaves the legislative branch of the government, and nothing must be left to the judgment of the electors or other appointee or delegate of the legislature, so that, in form and substance, it is a law in all its details in presenti, but which may be left to take effect in futuro, if necessary, upon the ascertainment of any prescribed fact or event.

                The law says that the Governor-General may fix “the maximum sale price that the industrial or merchant may demand.” The law is a general law and not a local or special law.

The proclamation undertakes to fix one price for rice in Manila and other and different prices in other and different provinces in the Philippine Islands, and delegates the power to determine the other and different prices to provincial treasurers and their deputies. Here, then, you would have a delegation of legislative power to the Governor-General, and a delegation by him of that power to provincial treasurers and their deputies, who “are hereby directed to communicate with, and execute all instructions emanating from the Director of Commerce and Industry, for the most effective and proper enforcement of the above regulations in their respective localities.” The issuance of the proclamation by the Governor-General was the exercise of the delegation of a delegated power, and was even a sub delegation of that power.

When Act No. 2868 is analyzed, it is the violation of the proclamation of the Governor-General which constitutes the crime. Without that proclamation, it was no crime to sell rice at any price. In other words, the Legislature left it to the sole discretion of the Governor-General to say what was and what was not “any cause” for enforcing the act, and what was and what was not “an extraordinary rise in the price of palay, rice or corn,” and under certain undefined conditions to fix the price at which rice should be sold, without regard to grade or quality, also to say whether a proclamation should be issued, if so, when, and whether or not the law should be enforced, how long it should be enforced, and when the law should be suspended. The Legislature did not specify or define what was “any cause,” or what was “an extraordinary rise in the price of rice, palay or corn,” Neither did it specify or define the conditions upon which the proclamation should be issued. In the absence of the proclamation no crime was committed. The alleged sale was made a crime, if at all, because the Governor-General issued the proclamation. The act or proclamation does not say anything about the different grades or qualities of rice, and the defendant is charged with the sale “of one ganta of rice at the price of eighty centavos (P0.80) which is a price greater than that fixed by Executive order No. 53.”

Act No. 2868, in so far as it undertakes to authorized the Governor-General in his discretion to issue a proclamation, fixing the price of rice, and to make the sale of rice in violation of the price of rice, and to make the sale of rice in violation of the proclamation a crime, is unconstitutional and void.