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Showing posts with label executive privilege. Show all posts
Showing posts with label executive privilege. Show all posts

Friday, April 19, 2013

Neri v. Senate Committee on Accountability of Public Officers and Investigations


Neri v. Senate Committee on Accountability of Public Officers and Investigations
Leonardo-De Castro, J.
G.R. No. 180643 September 4, 2008

Facts:

This case is about the Senate investigation of anomalies concerning the NBN-ZTE project. During the hearings, former NEDA head Romulo Neri refused to answer certain questions involving his conversations with President Arroyo on the ground they are covered by executive privilege. When the Senate cited him in contempt and ordered his arrest, Neri filed a case against the Senate with the Supreme Court. On March 25, 2008, the Supreme Court ruled in favor of Neri and upheld the claim of executive privilege.

What is “executive privilege”?

It is the right of the President and high-level executive branch officials to withhold information from Congress, the courts and the public. It is a privilege of confidentiality which applies to certain types of information of a sensitive character that would be against the public interest to disclose. Executive privilege is based on the constitution because it relates to the President’s effective discharge of executive powers. Its ultimate end is to promote public interest and no other.

Is executive privilege absolute?

No. Any claim of executive privilege must be weighed against other interests recognized by the constitution, like the state policy of full public disclosure of all transactions involving public interest, the right of the people to information on matters of public concern, the accountability of public officers, the power of legislative inquiry, and the judicial power to secure evidence in deciding cases.

Did the revocation by the President of E.O. 464 on March 6, 2008 diminish the concept of executive privilege?

No. Executive privilege may still be invoked despite the President’s revocation of E.O. 464 because it is based on the constitution.

What events led to the filing of the case before the Supreme Court?

On April 21, 2007, the DOTC and Zhing Xing Telecommunications Equipment (ZTE), a corporation owned by the People’s Republic of China, executed a “Contract for the Supply of Equipment and Services for the National Broadband Network Project” (NBN-ZTE Contract) worth US$329,481,290.00 (around PhP 16B). The project sought to provide landline, cellular and internet services in government offices nationwide and was to be financed through a loan by China to the Philippines. President Arroyo witnessed the contract signing in China.

After its signing, reports of anomalies concerning the project (e.g., bribery, “overpricing” by US$ 130M, “kickback commissions” involving top government officials, and loss of the contract) prompted the Senate, through the Committees on Accountability of Public Officers and Investigations (Blue Ribbon), Trade and Commerce, and National Defense and Security, to conduct an inquiry in aid of legislation. The inquiry was based on a number of Senate resolutions and in connection with pending bills concerning funding in the procurement of government projects, contracting of loans as development assistance, and Senate concurrence to executive agreements.

In one of the hearings held on Sept. 26, 2007, former NEDA Director General Romulo Neri testified that President Arroyo initially gave instructions for the project to be undertaken on a Build-Operate-Transfer (BOT) arrangement so the government would not spend money for it, but eventually the project was awarded to ZTE with a government-to-government loan from China. He also said that then COMELEC Chairman Benjamin Abalos, the alleged broker in the project, offered him PhP 200M in exchange for NEDA’s approval of the project. Neri testified that when he told President Arroyo of the bribe offer, she told him not to accept it. But Neri refused to answer questions about what he and the President discussed after that, invoking executive privilege since they concerned his conversations with the President. The Senate required him to appear again and testify on November 20, 2007. On November 15, 2007, Executive Secretary Eduardo Ermita wrote the Senate Committees and asked that Neri’s testimony on November 20, 2007 be dispensed with because he was invoking executive privilege “by Order of the President” specifically on the following questions:

a.        Whether the President followed up on the NBN project?
b.       Were you dictated to prioritize the ZTE?
c.        Whether the President said to go ahead and approve the project after being told about the alleged bribe?

When Neri failed to appear on November 20, 2007, the Senate required him to show cause why he should not be cited in contempt. Neri explained that he thought the only remaining questions were those he claimed to be covered by executive privilege and that should there be new matters to be taken up, he asked that he be informed in advance of what else he needs to clarify so he could prepare himself.

On Dec. 7, 2007, Neri questioned the validity of the Senate’s show cause order before the Supreme Court. On January 30, 2008, the Senate cited Neri in contempt and ordered his arrest for his failure to appear in the Senate hearings. On February 1, 2008, Neri asked the Supreme Court to stop the Senate from implementing its contempt order, which the Court granted on Feb. 5, 2008. The Supreme Court also required the parties to observe the status quo prevailing before the issuance of the contempt order.

What reasons were given for the claim of executive privilege?

Executive Secretary Ermita said that “the context in which executive privilege is being invoked is that the information sought to be disclosed might impair our diplomatic as well as economic relations with the People’s Republic of China.” Neri further added that his “conversations with the President dealt with delicate and sensitive national security and diplomatic matters relating to the impact of the bribery scandal involving high government officials and the possible loss of confidence of foreign investors and lenders in the Philippines.”

What issues were considered by the Supreme Court in resolving the case?

The Supreme Court said there were two crucial questions at the core of the controversy:

a.        Are the communications sought to be elicited by the three questions covered by executive privilege?
b.       Did the Senate Committees commit grave abuse of discretion in citing Neri in contempt and ordering his arrest?

How did the Supreme Court resolve these issues?

The Supreme Court first recognized the power of Congress to conduct inquiries in aid of legislation. The Court said that the power extends even to executive officials and the only way for them to be exempted is through a valid claim of executive privilege.

On the first question, the Supreme Court said that the communications sought to be elicited by the three questions are covered by the presidential communications privilege, which is one type of executive privilege. Hence, the Senate cannot compel Neri to answer the three questions.

On the second question, the Supreme Court said that the Senate Committees committed grave abuse of discretion in citing Neri in contempt. Hence, the Senate order citing Neri in contempt and ordering his arrest was not valid.

What are the types of executive privilege?

a.        state secrets (regarding military, diplomatic and other security matters)
b.       identity of government informers
c.        information related to pending investigations
d.       presidential communications
e.        deliberative process

In what cases is the claim of executive privilege highly recognized?

The claim of executive privilege is highly recognized in cases where the subject of inquiry relates to a power textually committed by the constitution to the President, such as the commander-in-chief, appointing, pardoning, and diplomatic powers of the President. Information relating to these powers may enjoy greater confidentiality than others.

What specifically are the executive privileges relating to deliberations or communications of the President and other government officials?

These are the presidential communications privilege and the deliberative process privilege.

How are the presidential communications privilege and the deliberative process privilege distinguished?

The presidential communications privilege applies to decision-making of the President. It pertains to “communications, documents or other materials that reflect presidential decision-making and deliberations and that the President believes should remain confidential”.

The deliberative process privilege applies to decision-making of executive officials. It includes “advisory opinions, recommendations and deliberations comprising part of a process by which governmental decisions and policies are formulated.”

Unlike the deliberative process privilege, the presidential communications privilege applies to documents in their entirety, and covers final and post-decisional materials as well as pre-deliberative ones.

Moreover, congressional or judicial negation of the presidential communications privilege is always subject to greater scrutiny than denial of the deliberative process privilege.

What is the type of executive privilege claimed in this case?

The type of executive privilege claimed in this case is the presidential communications privilege.

Is there a presumption in favor of presidential communications?

Yes. Presidential communications are “presumptively privileged”. The presumption is based on the President’s generalized interest in confidentiality. The privilege is necessary to guarantee the candor of presidential advisors and to provide the President and those who assist him with freedom to explore alternatives in the process of shaping policies and making decisions and to do so in a way many would be unwilling to express except privately.

The presumption can be overcome only by mere showing of public need by the branch seeking access to presidential communications.

Who are covered by the presidential communications privilege?

Aside from the President, the presidential communications privilege covers senior presidential advisors or Malacañang staff who have “operational proximity” to direct presidential decision-making.

What are the elements of the presidential communications privilege?

The following are the elements of the presidential communications privilege:

a.        The protected communication must relate to a “quintessential and non-delegable presidential power”.
b.       The communication must be authored or “solicited and received” by a close advisor of the President or the President himself. The advisor must be in “operational proximity” with the President.
c.        The privilege is a qualified privilege that may be overcome by a showing of adequate or compelling need that would justify the limitation of the privilege and that the information sought is unavailable elsewhere by an appropriate investigating agency.

What are examples of “quintessential and non-delegable presidential powers” which are covered by the presidential communications privilege?

The privilege covers only those functions which form the core of presidential authority. These are functions which involve “quintessential and non-delegable presidential powers” such as the powers of the president as commander-in-chief (i.e., to call out the armed forces to suppress violence, to declare martial law, or to suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus), the power to appoint officials and remove them, the power to grant pardons and reprieves, the power to receive ambassadors, and the power to negotiate treaties and to enter into execute agreements.

Are the elements of the presidential communications privilege present in this case?

Yes. The communications elicited by the three questions are covered by the presidential communications privilege because:

a.        First, the communications relate to the power of the President to enter into an executive agreement with other countries.
b.       Second, the communications are received by Neri, who as a Cabinet member can be considered a close advisor of the President.
c.        Third, the Senate Committees have not adequately shown a compelling need for the answers to the three questions in the enactment of a law and of the unavailability of the information elsewhere by an appropriate investigating authority.

Does the grant of the claim of executive privilege violate the right of the people to information on matters of public concern?

No, for the following reasons:

a.        Neri appeared before the Senate on Sept. 26, 2007 and was questioned for 11 hours. He also expressed his willingness to answer more questions from the Senators, except the three questions.
b.       The right to information is subject to limitation, such as executive privilege.
c.        The right of Congress to obtain information in aid of legislation cannot be equated with the people’s right to information. Congress cannot claim that every legislative inquiry is an exercise of the people’s right to information.

Was the claim of executive privilege properly invoked by the President in this case?

Yes. For the claim to be properly invoked, there must be a formal claim by the President stating the “precise and certain reason” for preserving confidentiality. The grounds relied upon by Executive Secretary Ermita are specific enough, since what is required is only that an allegation be made “whether the information demanded involves military or diplomatic secrets, closed-door Cabinet meetings, etc.” The particular ground must only be specified, and the following statement of grounds by Executive Secretary Ermita satisfies the requirement: “The context in which executive privilege is being invoked is that the information sought to be disclosed might impair our diplomatic as well as economic relations with the People’s Republic of China.”

What reasons were given by the Supreme Court in holding that it was wrong for the Senate to cite Neri in contempt and order his arrest?

a.        There was a legitimate claim of executive privilege.
b.       The Senate’s invitations to Neri did not include the possible needed statute which prompted the inquiry, the subject of inquiry, and the questions to be asked.
c.        The contempt order lacked the required number of votes.
d.       The Senate’s rules of procedure on inquiries in aid of
a.        legislation were not duly published.
e.        The contempt order is arbitrary and precipitate because the Senate did not first rule on the claim of executive privilege and instead dismissed Neri’s explanation as unsatisfactory.

Who has the burden of showing whether or not a claim of executive privilege is valid?

Executive privilege is in derogation of the search for truth. However, the decision recognized Presidential communications as presumptively privileged. Hence, the party seeking disclosure of the information has the burden of overcoming the presumption in favor of the confidentiality of Presidential communications.

This presumption is inconsistent with the Court’s earlier statement in Senate vs. Ermita (April 20, 2006) that “the presumption inclines heavily against executive secrecy and in favor of disclosure”. It is also inconsistent with constitutional provisions on transparency in governance and accountability of public officers, and the right of the people to information on matters of public concern.

Does the decision expand the coverage of executive privilege?

Yes, the decision expands the coverage of executive privilege in at least two ways:

a.        The decision explained that the presidential communications privilege covers communications authored or “solicited and received” by a close advisor of the President or the President himself. This means that the privilege applies not only to communications that directly involve the President, but also to communications involving the President’s close advisors, i.e., those in “operational proximity” with the President. There is no definition of “operational proximity”, so it is not clear how far down the chain of command the privilege extends. This expansion of the coverage of the privilege means that information in many areas of the executive branch will become “sequestered” from public view.

b.       The decision also stated that the presidential communications privilege applies to documents in their entirety, and covers final and post-decisional materials as well as pre-deliberative ones. This means that the privilege protects not only the deliberative or advice portions of documents, i.e., communications made in the process of arriving at presidential decisions, but also factual material or information concerning decisions already reached by the President.

How will the decision affect other investigations?

The decision makes it easy for the President to invoke executive privilege, since what is required is only that an allegation be made “whether the information demanded involves military or diplomatic secrets, closed-door Cabinet meetings, etc.” This in effect will enable the use of executive privilege to hide misconduct or crime. According to Fr. Bernas, S.J., the implication of the ruling is that once the “presidential communications privilege” is invoked, no evidence is needed to support it even if there are valid reasons for disclosing the information sought. “This would revolutionize the doctrine in a manner that can affect all other investigations. This can, for instance, hamper effective use of the … writ of amparo and writ of habeas data. It can also cripple efforts to battle official corruption ….”

In particular, what is the effect of the decision on the Senate’s power to conduct inquiries in aid of legislation?

The decision severely limits the Senate’s power of legislative inquiry and its ability to investigate government anomalies in aid of legislation. The decision encroaches upon matters internal to the Senate as an institution separate from and co-equal to other branches of government.

The decision, for instance, requires the Senate to give its questions in advance of its hearings. But this is a requirement applicable only to the question hour and not to inquiries in aid of legislation. Moreover, it is impractical, since follow-up questions of Senators will be difficult to anticipate.

The decision also requires the Senate to publish its rules of procedure on legislative inquiries every three years. But the Senate traditionally considered as a continuing body. Senate committees continue to work even during senatorial elections. By tradition and practice, the Senate does not re-publish its rules. To require publication of its rules every three years is unnecessary and inconsistent with its tradition and practice.

Did the Supreme Court ruling establish a doctrine on executive privilege?

No. Although the vote is 9 – 6 in favor of upholding the claim of executive privilege, two of the nine Justices concurred merely in the result, while one Justice argued not on the basis of executive privilege. Hence, only six out of the nine Justices explained their votes in favor of the claim of executive privilege. Six out of a total of 15 Justices do not establish a doctrine.

Can the Senate continue with its investigations despite the Supreme Court ruling?

The decision does not stop the Senate from continuing with its investigations and from undertaking other inquiries, although the government has already declared that officials will not appear unless the Senate rules are first published. Should Neri (and other officials) appear, the Senate can ask him questions other than the three questions. But Neri may again invoke executive privilege on other questions, which could result in another case before the Supreme Court, and the cycle may be repeated again and again. Such a situation, particularly where there appears to be a pattern of concealment in government activities, will ultimately be harmful to public interest.


Senate v. Ermita


Senate v. Ermita
G.R. No. 169777 April 20, 2006
Carpio-Morales, J.

Facts:

                In 2005, scandals involving anomalous transactions about the North Rail Project as well as the Garci tapes surfaced. This prompted the Senate to conduct a public hearing to investigate the said anomalies particularly the alleged overpricing in the NRP. The investigating Senate committee issued invitations to certain department heads and military officials to speak before the committee as resource persons. Ermita submitted that he and some of the department heads cannot attend the said hearing due to pressing matters that need immediate attention. AFP Chief of Staff Senga likewise sent a similar letter. Drilon, the senate president, excepted the said requests for they were sent belatedly and arrangements were already made and scheduled. Subsequently, GMA issued EO 464 which took effect immediately. EO 464 basically prohibited Department heads, Senior officials of executive departments who in the judgment of the department heads are covered by the executive privilege; Generals and flag officers of the Armed Forces of the Philippines and such other officers who in the judgment of the Chief of Staff are covered by the executive privilege; Philippine National Police (PNP) officers with rank of chief superintendent or higher and such other officers who in the judgment of the Chief of the PNP are covered by the executive privilege; Senior national security officials who in the judgment of the National Security Adviser are covered by the executive privilege; and Such other officers as may be determined by the President, from appearing in such hearings conducted by Congress without first securing the president’s approval. The department heads and the military officers who were invited by the Senate committee then invoked EO 464 to except themselves. Despite EO 464, the scheduled hearing proceeded with only 2 military personnel attending. For defying President Arroyo’s order barring military personnel from testifying before legislative inquiries without her approval, Brig. Gen. Gudani and Col. Balutan were relieved from their military posts and were made to face court martial proceedings. EO 464’s constitutionality was assailed for it is alleged that it infringes on the rights and duties of Congress to conduct investigation in aid of legislation and conduct oversight functions in the implementation of laws.

Issue:

                Is Section 3 of E.O. 464, which requires all the public officials, enumerated in Section 2(b) to secure the consent of the President prior to appearing before either house of Congress, valid and constitutional?

Held:

                The SC ruled that EO 464 is constitutional in part. To determine the validity of the provisions of EO 464, the SC sought to distinguish Section 21 from Section 22 of Art 6 of the 1987 Constitution. The Congress’ power of inquiry is expressly recognized in Section 21 of Article VI of the Constitution. Although there is no provision in the Constitution expressly investing either House of Congress with power to make investigations and exact testimony to the end that it may exercise its legislative functions advisedly and effectively, such power is so far incidental to the legislative function as to be implied.  In other words, the power of inquiry – with process to enforce it – is an essential and appropriate auxiliary to the legislative function.  A legislative body cannot legislate wisely or effectively in the absence of information respecting the conditions which the legislation is intended to affect or change; and where the legislative body does not itself possess the requisite information – which is not infrequently true – recourse must be had to others who do possess it. Section 22 on the other hand provides for the Question Hour. The Question Hour is closely related with the legislative power, and it is precisely as a complement to or a supplement of the Legislative Inquiry.  The appearance of the members of Cabinet would be very, very essential not only in the application of check and balance but also, in effect, in aid of legislation. Section 22 refers only to Question Hour, whereas, Section 21 would refer specifically to inquiries in aid of legislation, under which anybody for that matter, may be summoned and if he refuses, he can be held in contempt of the House. A distinction was thus made between inquiries in aid of legislation and the question hour.  While attendance was meant to be discretionary in the question hour, it was compulsory in inquiries in aid of legislation. Sections 21 and 22, therefore, while closely related and complementary to each other, should not be considered as pertaining to the same power of Congress.  One specifically relates to the power to conduct inquiries in aid of legislation, the aim of which is to elicit information that may be used for legislation, while the other pertains to the power to conduct a question hour, the objective of which is to obtain information in pursuit of Congress’ oversight function.  Ultimately, the power of Congress to compel the appearance of executive officials under Section 21 and the lack of it under Section 22 find their basis in the principle of separation of powers.  While the executive branch is a co-equal branch of the legislature, it cannot frustrate the power of Congress to legislate by refusing to comply with its demands for information.  When Congress exercises its power of inquiry, the only way for department heads to exempt themselves therefrom is by a valid claim of privilege.  They are not exempt by the mere fact that they are department heads.  Only one executive official may be exempted from this power — the President on whom executive power is vested, hence, beyond the reach of Congress except through the power of impeachment.   It is based on her being the highest official of the executive branch, and the due respect accorded to a co-equal branch of government which is sanctioned by a long-standing custom.   The requirement then to secure presidential consent under Section 1, limited as it is only to appearances in the question hour, is valid on its face.  For under Section 22, Article VI of the Constitution, the appearance of department heads in the question hour is discretionary on their part. Section 1 cannot, however, be applied to appearances of department heads in inquiries in aid of legislation.  Congress is not bound in such instances to respect the refusal of the department head to appear in such inquiry, unless a valid claim of privilege is subsequently made, either by the President herself or by the Executive Secretary.

When Congress merely seeks to be informed on how department heads are implementing the statutes which it has issued, its right to such information is not as imperative as that of the President to whom, as Chief Executive, such department heads must give a report of their performance as a matter of duty. In such instances, Section 22, in keeping with the separation of powers, states that Congress may only request their appearance. Nonetheless, when the inquiry in which Congress requires their appearance is ‘in aid of legislation’ under Section 21, the appearance is mandatory for the same reasons stated in Arnault.

Issue:

                whether the privilege against self incrimination protects the petitioner from being questioned

Held:

                No. Court is satisfied that those answers of the witness to the important question, which is the name of that person to whom witness gave the P440,000, were obviously false. His insistent claim before the bar of the Senate that if he should reveal the name he would incriminate himself, necessarily implied that he knew the name. Moreover, it is unbelievable that he gave P440,000 to a person to him unknown. Testimony which is obviously false or evasive is equivalent to a refusal to testify and is punishable as contempt, assuming that a refusal to testify would be so punishable. Since according to the witness himself the transaction was legal, and that he gave the P440,000 to a representative of Burt in compliance with the latter’s verbal instruction, Court found no basis upon which to sustain his claim that to reveal the name of that person might incriminate him.