Daza v. Singson

Daza v. Singson

G.R. No. 86344 December 21, 1989

Cruz, J.

Facts:

                The House of Representatives. Twenty four members of the Liberal Party formally resigned from that party and joined the LDP, thereby swelling its number to 159 and correspondingly reducing their former party to only 17 members.

On the basis of this development, the House of Representatives revised its representation in the Commission on Appointments by withdrawing the seat occupied by the petitioner and giving this to the newly-formed LDP. On December 5, 1988, the chamber elected a new set of representatives consisting of the original members except the petitioner and including therein respondent Luis C. Singson as the additional member from the LDP.

The petitioner came to the Supreme Court to challenge his removal from the Commission on Appointments and the assumption of his seat by the respondent. Acting initially on his petition for prohibition and injunction with preliminary injunction, we issued a temporary restraining order that same day to prevent both the petitioner and the respondent from serving in the Commission on Appointments.

Briefly stated, the contention of the petitioner is that he cannot be removed from the Commission on Appointments because his election thereto is permanent. His claim is that the reorganization of the House representation in the said body is not based on a permanent political realignment because the LDP is not a duly registered political party and has not yet attained political stability.

Issue:

                whether the question raised by the petitioner is political in nature and so beyond the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court

Held:

                No. The Court has the competence to act on the matter at bar. The issue involved is not a discretionary act of the House of Representatives that may not be reviewed by us because it is political in nature. What is involved here is the legality, not the wisdom, of the act of that chamber in removing the petitioner from the Commission on Appointments.

               

The term political question connotes, in legal parlance, what it means in ordinary parlance, namely, a question of policy. In other words, it refers to those questions which, under the Constitution, are to be decided by the people in their sovereign capacity, or in regard to which full discretionary authority has been delegated to the Legislature or executive branch of the Government. It is concerned with issues dependent upon the wisdom, not legality, of a particular measure.

                Even if we were to assume that the issue presented before us was political in nature, we would still not be precluded from resolving it under the expanded jurisdiction conferred upon us that now covers, in proper cases, even the political question. Article VII, Section 1, of the Constitution clearly provides:

Section 1. The judicial power shall be vested in one Supreme Court and in such lower courts as may be established by law.

Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable, and to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government.

Sanidad v. COMELEC

Sanidad v. COMELEC

G.R. No. L-44640 October 12, 1976

Martin, J.

Facts:

                On September 2, 1976, President Ferdinand E. Marcos issued Presidential Decree No. 991 calling for a national referendum on October 16, 1976 for the Citizens Assemblies (“barangays”) to resolve, among other things, the issues of martial law, the I . assembly, its replacement, the powers of such replacement, the period of its existence, the length of the period for tile exercise by the President of his present powers.

Twenty days after or on September 22, 1976, the President issued another related decree, Presidential Decree No. 1031, amending the previous Presidential Decree No. 991, by declaring the provisions of presidential Decree No. 229 providing for the manner of voting and canvass of votes in “barangays” (Citizens Assemblies) applicable to the national referendum-plebiscite of October 16, 1976. Quite relevantly, Presidential Decree No. 1031 repealed Section 4, of Presidential Decree No. 991, the full text of which (Section 4) is quoted in the footnote below.

On the same date of September 22, 1976, the President issued Presidential Decree No. 1033, stating the questions to be submitted to the people in the referendum-plebiscite on October 16, 1976. The Decree recites in its “whereas” clauses that the people’s continued opposition to the convening of the National Assembly evinces their desire to have such body abolished and replaced thru a constitutional amendment, providing for a legislative body, which will be submitted directly to the people in the referendum-plebiscite of October 16.

The questions ask, to wit:

(1)     Do you want martial law to be continued?

(2)    Whether or not you want martial law to be continued, do you approve the following amendments to the Constitution? For the purpose of the second question, the referendum shall have the effect of a plebiscite within the contemplation of Section 2 of Article XVI of the Constitution.

Petitioners contend that under the 1935 and 1973 Constitutions there is no grant to the incumbent President to exercise the constituent power to propose amendments to the new Constitution. As a consequence, the Referendum-Plebiscite on October 16 has no constitutional or legal basis.

On September 27, 1976, PABLO C. SANIDAD and PABLITO V. SANIDAD, father and son, commenced L-44640 for Prohibition with Preliminary Injunction seeking to enjoin the Commission on Elections from holding and conducting the Referendum Plebiscite on October 16; to declare without force and effect Presidential Decree Nos. 991 and 1033, insofar as they propose amendments to the Constitution, as well as Presidential Decree No. 1031, insofar as it directs the Commission on Elections to supervise, control, hold, and conduct the Referendum-Plebiscite scheduled on October 16, 1976.

Petitioners argue that even granting him legislative powers under Martial Law, the incumbent President cannot act as a constituent assembly to propose amendments to the Constitution; a referendum-plebiscite is untenable under the Constitutions of 1935 and 1973; the submission of the proposed amendments in such a short period of time for deliberation renders the plebiscite a nullity; to lift Martial Law, the President need not consult the people via referendum; and allowing 15-year olds to vote would amount to an amendment of the Constitution, which confines the right of suffrage to those citizens of the Philippines 18 years of age and above.

Issue:

                Is the question of the constitutionality of Presidential Decrees Nos. 991, 1031 and 1033 political or justiciable?

Held:

                No. The amending process both as to proposal and ratification, raises a judicial question. 8 This is especially true in cases where the power of the Presidency to initiate the of normally exercised by the legislature, is seriously doubted. Under the terms of the 1973 Constitution, the power to propose amendments o the constitution resides in the interim National Assembly in the period of transition (See. 15, Transitory provisions). After that period, and the regular National Assembly in its active session, the power to propose amendments becomes ipso facto the prerogative of the regular National Assembly (Sec. 1, pars. 1 and 2 of Art. XVI, 1973 constitution). The normal course has not been followed. Rather than calling the National Assembly to constitute itself into a constituent assembly the incumbent President undertook the proposal of amendments and submitted the proposed amendments thru Presidential Decree 1033 to the people in a Referendum-Plebiscite on October 16. Unavoidably, the regularity regularity of the procedure for amendments, written in lambent words in the very Constitution sought to be amended, raises a contestable issue. The implementing Presidential Decree Nos. 991, 1031, and 1033, which commonly purport to have the force and effect of legislation are assailed as invalid, thus the issue of the validity of said Decrees is plainly a justiciable one, within the competence of the Supreme Court to pass upon. Section 2 (2), Article X of the new Constitution provides: “All cases involving the constitutionality of a treaty, executive agreement, or law may shall be heard and decided by the Supreme Court en banc and no treaty, executive agreement, or law may be declared unconstitutional without the concurrence of at least ten Members. ...” The Supreme Court has the last word in the construction not only of treaties and statutes, but also of the Constitution itself The amending, like all other powers organized in the Constitution, is in form a delegated and hence a limited power, so that the Supreme Court is vested with that authorities to determine whether that power has been discharged within its limits.

Political questions are neatly associated with the wisdom, of the legality of a particular act. Where the vortex of the controversy refers to the legality or validity of the contested act, that matter is definitely justiciable or non-political. What is in the heels of the Court is not the wisdom of the act of the incumbent President in proposing amendments to the Constitution, but his constitutional authority to perform such act or to assume the power of a constituent assembly. Whether the amending process confers on the President that power to propose amendments is therefore a downright justiciable question. Should the contrary be found, the actuation of the President would merely be a brutum fulmen. If the Constitution provides how it may be amended, the judiciary as the interpreter of that Constitution, can declare whether the procedure followed or the authority assumed was valid or not.

Issue:

                During the present stage of the transition period, and under, the environmental circumstances now obtaining, does the President possess power to propose amendments to the Constitution as well as set up the required machinery and prescribe the procedure for the ratification of his proposals by the people?

Held:

                Yes. Article XVI of the 1973 Constitution on Amendments ordains:

SECTION 1. (1) Any amendment to, or revision of, this Constitution may be proposed by the National Assembly upon a vote of three-fourths of all its Members, or by a constitutional convention. (2) The National Assembly may, by a vote of two-thirds of all its Members, call a constitutional convention or, by a majority vote of all its Members, submit the question of calling such a convention to the electorate in an election.

SECTION 2. Any amendment to, or revision of, this Constitution shall be valid when ratified by a majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite which shall be held not later than three months after the approval of such amendment or revision.

In the present period of transition, the interim National Assembly instituted in the Transitory Provisions is conferred with that amending power. Section 15 of the Transitory Provisions reads:

SECTION 15. The interim National Assembly, upon special call by the interim Prime Minister, may, by a majority vote of all its Members, propose amendments to this Constitution. Such amendments shall take effect when ratified in accordance with Article Sixteen hereof.

There are, therefore, two periods contemplated in the constitutional life of the nation, i.e., period of normalcy and period of transition. In times of normally, the amending process may be initiated by the proposals of the (1) regular National Assembly upon a vote of three-fourths of all its members; or (2) by a Constitutional Convention called by a vote of two-thirds of all the Members of the National Assembly. However the calling of a Constitutional Convention may be submitted to the electorate in an election voted upon by a majority vote of all the members of the National Assembly. In times of transition, amendments may be proposed by a majority vote of all the Members of the National Assembly upon special call by the interim Prime Minister. The incumbent President is vested with that prerogative of discretion as to when he shall initially convene the interim National Assembly.

The Constitutional Convention intended to leave to the President the determination of the time when he shall initially convene the interim National Assembly, consistent with the prevailing conditions of peace and order in the country. When the Delegates to the Constitutional Convention voted on the Transitory Provisions, they were aware of the fact that under the same, the incumbent President was given the discretion as to when he could convene the interim National Assembly; it was so stated plainly by the sponsor, Delegate Yaneza; as a matter of fact, the proposal that it be convened ‘immediately’, made by Delegate Pimentel (V) was rejected. The President’s decision to defer the convening of the interim National Assembly soon found support from the people themselves. In the plebiscite of January 10-15, 1973, at which the ratification of the 1973 Constitution was submitted, the people voted against the convening of the interim National Assembly. In the referendum of July 24, 1973, the Citizens Assemblies (“barangays”) reiterated their sovereign will to withhold the convening of the interim National Assembly. Again, in the referendum of February 27, 1975, the proposed question of whether the interim National Assembly shall be initially convened was eliminated, because some of the members of Congress and delegates of the Constitutional Convention, who were deemed automatically members of the I interim National Assembly, were against its inclusion since in that referendum of January, 1973, the people had already resolved against it.

When the legislative arm of the state undertakes the proposals of amendment to a Constitution, that body is not in the usual function of lawmaking. It is not legislating when engaged in the amending process.16 Rather, it is exercising a peculiar power bestowed upon it by the fundamental charter itself. In the Philippines, that power is provided for in Article XVI of the 1973 Constitution (for the regular National Assembly) or in Section 15 of the Transitory Provisions (for the National Assembly). While ordinarily it is the business of the legislating body to legislate for the nation by virtue of constitutional conferment amending of the Constitution is not legislative in character. In political science a distinction is made between constitutional content of an organic character and that of a legislative character’. The distinction, however, is one of policy, not of law. Such being the case, approval of the President of any proposed amendment is a misnomer. The prerogative of the President to approve or disapprove applies only to the ordinary cases of legislation. The President has nothing to do with proposition or adoption of amendments to the Constitution.

In general, the governmental powers in crisis government during martial law are more or less concentrated in the President. The presidential exercise of legislative powers in time of martial law is now a conceded valid at. That sun clear authority of the President is saddled on Section 3 (pars. 1 and 2) of the Transitory Provisions, thus:

The incumbent President of the Philippines shall initially convene the interim National Assembly and shall preside over its sessions until the interim Speaker shall have been elected. He shall continue to exercise his powers and prerogatives under the nineteen hundred and thirty-five Constitution and the powers vested in the President and the Prime Minister under this Constitution until the calls upon the interim National Assembly to elect the interim President and the interim Prime Minister, who shall then exercise their respective powers vested by this Constitution.

All proclamations, orders, decrees, instructions, and acts promulgated, issued, or done by the incumbent President shall be part of the law of the land, and shall remain valid, binding, and effective even after lifting of martial law or the ratification of this Constitution, unless modified, revoked, or superseded by subsequent proclamations, orders, decrees, instructions, or other acts of the incumbent President, or unless expressly and explicitly modified or repealed by the regular National Assembly.

The power to legislate is constitutionally consigned to the interim National Assembly during the transition period. However, the initial convening of that Assembly is a matter fully addressed to the judgment of the incumbent President. And, in the exercise of that judgment, the President opted to defer convening of that body in utter recognition of the people’s preference. Likewise, in the period of transition, the power to propose amendments to the Constitution lies in the interim National Assembly upon special call by the President (See. 15 of the Transitory Provisions). Again, harking to the dictates of the sovereign will, the President decided not to call the interim National Assembly. Would it then be within the bounds of the Constitution and of law for the President to assume that constituent power of the interim Assembly vis-a-vis his assumption of that body’s legislative functions? The answer is yes. If the President has been legitimately discharging the legislative functions of the interim Assembly, there is no reason why he cannot validly discharge the function of that Assembly to propose amendments to the Constitution, which is but adjunct, although peculiar, to its gross legislative power.

Tañada v. Cuenco

Tañada v. Cuenco

G.R. No. L-10520 February 28, 1957

Concepcion, J.

Facts:

                Petitioner Lorenzo M. Tañada is a member of the Senate of the Philippines, and President of the Citizens Party, whereas petitioner Diosdado Macapagal, a member of the House of Representatives of the Philippines, was one of the official candidates of the Liberal Party for the Senate, at the General elections held in November, 1955, in which Pacita Madrigal Warns, Lorenzo Sumulong, Quintin Paredes, Francisco Rodrigo, Pedro Sabido, Claro M. Recto, Domocao Alonto and Decoroso Rosales, were proclaimed elected. Subsequently, the elections of this Senators-elect-who eventually assumed their respective seats in the Senate-was contested by petitioner Macapagal, together with Camilo Osias, Geronima Pecson, Macario Peralta, Enrique Magalona, Pio Pedrosa and William Chiongbian-who had, also, run for the Senate, in said election-in Senate Electoral Case No. 4, now pending before the Senate Electoral Tribunal.

The Senate, in its session of February 22, 1956, upon nomination of Senator Cipriano Primicias, on behalf of the Nacionalista Party, chose Senators Jose P. Laurel, Fernando Lopez and Cipriano Primicias, as members of the Senate Electoral Tribunal. Upon nomination of petitioner Senator Tañada, on behalf of the Citizens Party, said petitioner was next chosen by the Senate as member of said Tribunal. Then, upon nomination of Senator Primicias on behalf of the Committee on Rules of the Senate, and over the objections of Senators Tañada and Sumulong, the Senate choose respondents Senators Mariano J. Cuenco and Francisco A. Delgado as members of the same Electoral Tribunal. Subsequently, the Chairman of the latter appointed: (1) Alfredo Cruz and Catalina Cayetano, as technical assistant and private secretary, respectively, to Senator Cuenco, as supposed member of the Senate Electoral Tribunal, upon his recommendation of said respondent; and (2) Manuel Serapio and Placido Reyes, as technical assistant and private secretary, respectively to Senator Delgado, as supposed member of said Electoral Tribunal, and upon his recommendation.

Soon, thereafter, Senator Lorenzo M. Tañada and Congressman Diosdado Macapagal instituted the case at bar against Senators Cuenco and Delgado, and said Alfredo Cruz, Catalina Cayetano, Manuel Serapio and Placido Reyes, as well as Fernando Hipolito, in his capacity as Cashier and Disbursing Officer of the Senate Electoral Tribunal. Petitioners allege that on February 22, 1956, as well as at present, the Senate consists of 23 Senators who belong to the Nacionalista Party, and one (1) Senator-namely, petitioner, Lorenzo M. Tañada-belonging to the Citizens Party; that the Committee on Rules for the Senate, in nominating Senators Cuenco and Delgado, and the Senate, in choosing these respondents, as members of the Senate Electoral Tribunal, had “acted absolutely without power or color of authority and in clear violation .. of Article VI, Section 11 of the Constitution”; that “in assuming membership in the Senate Electoral Tribunal, by taking the corresponding oath of office therefor”, said respondents had “acted absolutely without color of appointment or authority and are unlawfully, and in violation of the Constitution, usurping, intruding into and exercising the powers of members of the Senate Electoral Tribunal”; that, consequently, the appointments of respondents, Cruz, Cayetano, Serapio and Reyes, as technical assistants and private secretaries to Senators Cuenco and Delgado-who caused said appointments to be made-as members of the Senate Electoral Tribunal, are unlawful and void; and that Senators Cuenco and Delgado “are threatening and are about to take cognizance of Electoral Case No. 4 of the Senate Electoral Tribunal, as alleged members thereof, in nullification of the rights of petitioner Lorenzo M. Tañada, both as a Senator belonging to the Citizens Party and as representative of the Citizens Party in the Senate Electoral Tribunal, and in deprivation of the constitutional rights of petitioner Diosdado Macapagal and his co-protestants to have their election protest tried and decided-by an Electoral Tribunal composed of not more than three (3) senators chosen by the Senate upon nomination of the party having the largest number of votes in the Senate and not more than the (3) Senators upon nomination of the Party having the second largest number of votes therein, together, three (3) Justice of the Supreme Court to be designated by the Chief Justice, instead of by an Electoral Tribunal packed with five members belonging to the Nacionalista Party, which is the rival party of the Liberal Party, to which the Petitioner Diosdado Macapagal and his co-protestants in Electoral Case No. 4 belong, the said five (5) Nacionalista Senators having been nominated and chosen in the manner alleged hereinabove”.

Issue:

                whether the case at bar raises merely a political question, not one justiciable in nature

Held:

                No. The phrase political question is frequently used to designate all questions that lie outside the scope of the judicial questions, which under the constitution, are to be decided by the people in their sovereign capacity, or in regard to which full discretionary authority has been delegated to the legislative or executive branch of the government. What is generally meant, when it is, said that a question is political, and not judicial, is that it is a matter which, is to be exercised by the people in their primary political capacity, or that it has been specifically delegated to some other department or particular officer of the government, with discretionary power to act.

                Legislature may in its discretion determine whether it will pass a law or submit a proposed constitutional amendment to the people. The courts have no judicial control over such matters, not merely because they involve political question, but because they are matters which the people have by the Constitution delegated to the Legislature. The Governor may exercise the powers delegated to him, free from judicial control, so long as he observes the laws and acts within the limits of the power conferred. His discretionary acts cannot be controllable, not primarily because they are of a political nature, but because the Constitution and laws have placed the particular matter under his control. But every officer under a constitutional government must act according to law and subject him to the restraining and controlling power of the people, acting through the courts, as well as through the executive or the Legislature.

In short, the term “political question” connotes, in legal parlance, what it means in ordinary parlance, namely, a question of policy. It refers to “those questions which, under the Constitution, are to be decided by the people in their sovereign capacity, or in regard to which full discretionary authority has been delegated to the Legislature or executive branch of the Government.” It is concerned with issues dependent upon the wisdom, not legality, of a particular measure.

Such is not the nature of the question for determination in the present case. Here, we are called upon to decide whether the election of Senators Cuenco and Delgado, by the Senate, as members of the Senate Electoral Tribunal, upon nomination by Senator Primicias-a member and spokesman of the party having the largest number of votes in the Senate-on behalf of its Committee on Rules, contravenes the constitutional mandate that said members of the Senate Electoral Tribunal shall be chosen “upon nomination .. of the party having the second largest number of votes” in the Senate, and hence, is null and void. This is not a political question. The Senate is not clothed with “full discretionary authority” in the choice of members of the Senate Electoral Tribunal. The exercise of its power thereon is subject to constitutional limitations which are claimed to be mandatory in nature. It is clearly within the legitimate prove of the judicial department to pass upon the validity the proceedings in connection therewith.

Issue:

                Is the election of Senators Cuenco and Delgado, by the Senate, as members of the Electoral Tribunal, valid and lawful?

(Petitioners maintain that the nomination and election of Senators Cuenco and Delgado-who belong to the Nacionalista Party-as members of the Senate Electoral Tribunal, are null and void and have been made without power or color of authority, for, after the nomination by said party, and the election by the Senate, of Senators Laurel, Lopez and Primicias, as members of said Tribunal, the other Senators, who shall be members thereof, must necessarily be nominated by the party having the second largest number of votes in the Senate, and such party is, admittedly, the Citizens Party, to which Senator Tañada belongs and which he represents.)

Held:

                No. The main objective of the framers of our Constitution in providing for the establishment, first, of an Electoral Commission, 8 and then 9 of one Electoral Tribunal for each House of Congress, was to insure the exercise of judicial impartiality in the disposition of election contests affecting members of the lawmaking body. To achieve this purpose, two devices were resorted to, namely: (a) the party having the largest number of votes, and the party having the second largest number of votes, in the National Assembly or in each House of Congress, were given the same number of representatives in the Electoral Commission or Tribunal, so that they may realize that partisan considerations could not control the adjudication of said cases, and thus be induced to act with greater impartiality; and (b) the Supreme Court was given in said body the same number of representatives as each one of said political parties, so that the influence of the former may be decisive and endow said Commission or Tribunal with judicial temper.

                The framers intended to prevent the majority party from controlling the Electoral Tribunals, and that the structure thereof is founded upon the equilibrium between the majority and the minority parties therein, with the Justices of the Supreme Court, who are members of said Tribunals, holding the resulting balance of power. The procedure prescribed in said provision for the selection of members of the Electoral Tribunals is vital to the role they are called upon to play. it constitutes the essence of said Tribunals. Hence, compliance with said procedure is mandatory, and acts performed in violation thereof are null and void.

It is true that the application of the foregoing criterion would limit the membership of the Senate Electoral Tribunal, in the case at bar, to seven (7), instead of nine (9), members; but, it is conceded that the present composition of the Senate was not foreseen by the framers of our Constitution. Furthermore, the spirit of the law prevails over its letter, and the solution herein adopted maintains the spirit of the Constitution, for partisan considerations cannot be decisive in a tribunal consisting of three (3) Justices of the Supreme Court, three (3) members nominated by the majority party and either one (1) or two (2) members nominated by the party having the second largest number of votes in the House concerned.

Upon the other hand, what would be the result of respondents’ contention if upheld? Owing to the fact that the Citizens Party has only one member in the Upper House, Senator Tañada felt he should nominate, for the Senate Electoral Tribunal, only said member of the Citizens Party. The same is, thus, numerically handicapped, vis-a-vis the majority party, in said Tribunal. Obviously, Senator Tañada did not nominate other two Senators, because, otherwise, he would worsen the already disadvantageous position, therein, of the Citizens Party. Indeed, by the aforementioned nomination and election of Senators Cuenco and Delgado, if the same were sanctioned, the Nacionalista Party would have five (5) members in the Senate Electoral Tribunal, as against one (1) member of the Citizens Party and three members of the Supreme Court. With the absolute majority thereby attained by the majority party in said Tribunal, the philosophy underlying the same would be entirely upset. The equilibrium between the political parties therein would be destroyed. What is worst, the decisive moderating role of the Justices of the Supreme Court would be wiped out, and, in lieu thereof, the door would be thrown wide open for the predominance of political considerations in the determination of election protests pending before said Tribunal, which is precisely what the fathers of our Constitution earnestly strove to forestall.

                In view of the foregoing, we hold that the Senate may not elect, as members of the Senate Electoral Tribunal, those Senators who have not been nominated by the political parties specified in the Constitution; that the party having the largest number of votes in the Senate may nominate not more than three (3) members thereof to said Electoral Tribunal; that the party having the second largest number of votes in the Senate has the exclusive right to nominate the other three (3) Senators who shall sit as members in the Electoral Tribunal; that neither these three (3) Senators, nor any of them, may be nominated by a person or party other than the one having the second largest number of votes in the Senate or its representative therein; that the Committee on Rules for the Senate has no standing to validly make such nomination and that the nomination of Senators Cuenco and Delgado by Senator Primicias, and the election of said respondents by the Senate, as members of said Tribunal, are null and void ab initio.

Casibang v. Aquino

Casibang v. Aquino

G.R. No. L-38025 August 20, 1979

Makasiar, J.

Facts:

                Respondent Remigio P. Yu was proclaimed on November 9, 1971 as the elected Mayor of Rosales, Pangasinan in the 1971 local elections, by a plurality of 501 votes over his only rival, herein petitioner, who seasonably filed a protest against the election of the former with the Court of First Instance of Pangasinan, on the grounds of (1) anomalies and irregularities in the appreciation, counting and consideration of votes in specified electoral precincts; (2) terrorism; (3) rampant vote buying; (4) open voting or balloting; and (5) excessive campaign expenditures and other violations of the 1971 Election Code.

In the meantime or on September 21, 1972, the incumbent President of the Republic of the Philippines issued Proclamation No. 1081, placing the entire country under Martial Law; and two months thereafter, more or less, or specifically on November 29, 1972, the 1971 Constitutional Convention passed and approved a Constitution to supplant the 1935 Constitution; and the same was thereafter overwhelmingly ratified by the sovereign people of the Republic of the Philippines on January 17, 1973; and on March 31, 1973, the Supreme Court declared that there is no further judicial obstacle to the new Constitution being considered in force and effect.

Thereafter or on October 10, 1973, at which time petitioner had already completed presenting his evidence and in fact had rested his case, respondent Yu moved to dismiss the election protest of petitioner on the ground that the trial court had lost jurisdiction over the same in view of the effectivity of the 1973 Constitution by reason of which — principally) Section 9 of Article XVII [Transitory Provisions] and Section 2 of Article XI — a political question has intervened in the case. Respondent Yu contended that “... the provisions in the 1935 Constitution relative to all local governments have been superseded by the 1973 Constitution. Therefore, all local government should adhere to our parliamentary form of government. This is clear in the New Constitution under its Article XI.” He further submitted that local elective officials (including mayors) have no more four-year term of office. They are only in office at the pleasure of the appointing power embodied in the New Constitution, and under Section 9 of Article XVII.

The thrust of the political question theory of respondent Yu is that the 1973 Constitution, through Section 9 of Article XVII thereof, protected only those incumbents, like him, at the time of its ratification and effectivity and are the only ones authorized to continue in office and their term of office as extended now depends on the pleasure of, as the same has been entrusted or committed to, the incumbent President of the Philippines or the Legislative Department; and that Section 2 of Article XI thereof entrusted to the National Assembly the revamp of the entire local government structure by the enactment of a local government code, thus presenting a question of policy, the necessity and expediency of which are outside the range of judicial review. In short, for the respondent Judge to still continue assuming jurisdiction over the pending election protest of petitioner is for him to take cognizance of a question or policy in regard to which full discretionary authority has been delegated to the Legislative or Executive branch of the government.

Issue:

                whether the issue involves a political question and therefore beyond judicial ambit

Held:

                No. Section 9 of Article XVII of the 1973 Constitution did not render moot and academic pending election protest cases. The constitutional grant of privilege to continue in office, made by the new Constitution for the benefit of persons who were incumbent officials or employees of the Government when the new Constitution took effect, cannot be fairly construed as indiscriminately encompassing every person who at the time happened to be performing the duties of an elective office, albeit under protest or contest” and that “subject to the constraints specifically mentioned in Section 9, Article XVII of the Transitory Provisions, it neither was, nor could have been the intention of the framers of our new fundamental law to disregard and shunt aside the statutory right of a candidate for elective position who, within the time-frame prescribed in the Election Code of 1971, commenced proceedings beamed mainly at the proper determination in a judicial forum of a proclaimed candidate-elect’s right to the contested office.

               

The right of the private respondents (protestees) to continue in office indefinitely arose not only by virtue of Section 9 of Article XVII of the New Constitution but principally from their having been proclaimed elected to their respective positions as a result of the November 8, 1971 elections. Therefore, if in fact and in law, they were not duly elected to their respective positions and consequently, have no right to hold the same, perform their functions, enjoy their privileges and emoluments, then certainly, they should not be allowed to enjoy the indefinite term of office given to them by said constitutional provision.

               

Until a subsequent law or presidential decree provides otherwise, the right of respondent (protestee) to continue as mayor rests on the legality of his election which has been protested by herein petitioner. Should the court decide adversely against him the electoral protest, respondent (protestee) would cease to be mayor even before a law or presidential decree terminates his tenure of office pursuant to said Section 9 of Article XVII of the 1973 Constitution.

               

There is a difference between the ‘term’ of office and the ‘right’ to hold an office. A ‘term’ of office is the period during winch an elected officer or appointee is entitled to hold office, perform its functions and enjoy its privileges and emoluments. A ‘right’ to hold a public office is the just and legal claim to hold and enjoy the powers and responsibilities of the office. In other words, the ‘term’ refers to the period, duration of length of time during which the occupant of an office is .entitled to stay therein whether such period be definite or indefinite. Hence, although Section 9, Article XVII of the New Constitution made the term of the petitioners indefinite, it did not foreclose any challenge by the herein petitioners, in an election protest, of the ‘right’ of the private respondents to continue holding their respective office. What has been directly affected by said constitutional provision is the ‘term’ to the office, although the ‘right’ of the incumbent to an office which he is legally holding is co-extensive with the ‘term’ thereof,” and that “it is erroneous to conclude that under Section 9, Article XVII of the New Constitution, the term of office of the private respondents expired, and that they are now holding their respective offices under a new term. They hold their respective offices still under the term to which they have been elected, although the same is now indefinite.

The New Constitution recognized the continuing jurisdiction of courts of first instance to hear, try and decide election protests: “Section 7 of Article XVII of the New Constitution provides that ‘all existing laws not inconsistent with this Constitution shall remain operative until amended, modified or repealed by the National Assembly. ‘And there has been no amendment, modification or repeal of Section 220 of the Election Code of 1971 which gave the herein petitioners the right to file an election contest against those proclaimed elected,” and “according to Section 8, Article XVII of the New Constitution ‘all courts existing at the time of the ratification of this Constitution shall continue and exercise their jurisdiction until otherwise provided by law in accordance with this Constitution, and all cases pending in said courts shall be heard, tried and determined under the laws then in force.’ Consequently, the Courts of First Instance presided over by the respondent-Judges should continue and exercise their jurisdiction to hear, try and decide the election protests filed by herein petitioners.”

While under the New Constitution the Commission on Elections is now the sole judge of all contests relating to the elections, returns, and qualifications of members of the National Assembly as well as elective provincial and city officials (par. 2 of Sec. 2, Article XII-C of the 1973 Constitution), such power does not extend to electoral contests concerning municipal elective positions.

General Order No. 3, issued by the President of the Philippines merely reiterated his powers under Section 9 of Article XVII of the New Constitution. The President did not intend thereby to modify the aforesaid constitutional provision.

General Order No. 3, as amended by General Order No. 3-A, does not expressly include electoral contests of municipal elective positions as among those removed from the jurisdiction of the courts; for said General Order, after affirming the jurisdiction of the Judiciary to decide in accordance with the existing laws on criminal and civil cases, simply removes from the jurisdiction of the Civil Court certain crimes specified therein as well as the validity, legality or constitutionality of any decree, order or acts issued by the President or his duly designated representative or by public servants pursuant to his decrees and orders issued under Proclamation No. 1081.

In the light of the foregoing pronouncements, the electoral protest case herein involved has remained a justiciable controversy. No political question has ever been interwoven into this case. Nor is there any act of the incumbent President or the Legislative Department to be indirectly reviewed or interfered with if the respondent Judge decides the election protest. The term “political question” connotes what it means in ordinary parlance, namely, a question of policy. It refers to those questions which under the Constitution, are to be decided by the people in their sovereign capacity; or in regard to which full discretionary authority has been delegated to the legislative or executive branch of the government. It is concerned with issues dependent upon the wisdom, not legality, of a particular measure”.

               

                The term has been made applicable to controversies clearly non-judicial and therefore beyond its jurisdiction or to an issue involved in a case appropriately subject to its cognizance, as to which there has been a prior legislative or executive determination to which deference must be paid. Political questions should refer to such as would under the Constitution be decided by the people in their sovereign capacity or in regard to which full discretionary authority is vested either in the President or Congress. It is thus beyond the competence of the judiciary to pass upon.