Biraogo v. Philippine Truth Commission
G.R. No.
192935 December 7, 2010
Mendoza, J.
Facts:
President Benigni
Simeon Aquino III signed Executive Order No. 1 establishing the Philippine Truth Commission of 2010 (Truth
Commission). Pertinent provisions of said executive order read:
EXECUTIVE ORDER NO. 1
CREATING THE PHILIPPINE TRUTH
COMMISSION OF 2010
WHEREAS, Article XI, Section 1 of the 1987 Constitution of the
Philippines solemnly enshrines the principle that a public office is a public
trust and mandates that public officers and employees, who are servants of the
people, must at all times be accountable to the latter, serve them with utmost
responsibility, integrity, loyalty and efficiency, act with patriotism and
justice, and lead modest lives;
WHEREAS, corruption is among the most despicable acts of defiance of this
principle and notorious violation of this mandate;
WHEREAS, corruption is an evil and scourge which seriously affects the
political, economic, and social life of a nation; in a very special way it inflicts
untold misfortune and misery on the poor, the marginalized and underprivileged
sector of society;
WHEREAS, corruption in the Philippines has reached very alarming levels,
and undermined the people’s trust and confidence in the Government and its institutions;
WHEREAS, there is an urgent call for the determination of the truth
regarding certain reports of large scale graft and corruption in the government
and to put a closure to them by the filing of the appropriate cases against
those involved, if warranted, and to deter others from committing the evil,
restore the people’s faith and confidence in the Government and in their public
servants;
WHEREAS, the President’s battlecry during his campaign for the Presidency
in the last elections “kung walang corrupt, walang mahirap” expresses a solemn
pledge that if elected, he would end corruption and the evil it breeds;
WHEREAS, there is a need for a separate body dedicated solely to
investigating and finding out the truth concerning the reported cases of graft
and corruption during the previous administration, and which will recommend the
prosecution of the offenders and secure justice for all;
WHEREAS, Book III, Chapter 10, Section 31 of Executive Order No. 292,
otherwise known as the Revised Administrative Code of the Philippines, gives
the President the continuing authority to reorganize the Office of the
President.
NOW, THEREFORE, I, BENIGNO SIMEON AQUINO III, President of the
Republic of the Philippines, by virtue of the powers vested in me by law, do
hereby order:
SECTION 1. Creation of a Commission. – There is hereby
created the PHILIPPINE TRUTH COMMISSION, hereinafter referred to as the “COMMISSION,” which shall primarily seek and find the
truth on, and toward this end, investigate reports of graft and corruption of
such scale and magnitude that shock and offend the moral and ethical
sensibilities of the people, committed by public officers and employees, their
co-principals, accomplices and accessories from the private sector, if any,
during the previous administration; and thereafter recommend the appropriate
action or measure to be taken thereon to ensure that the full measure of
justice shall be served without fear or favor.
The Commission shall be composed of a Chairman and four (4)
members who will act as an independent collegial body.
SECTION 2. Powers and Functions. – The Commission, which shall have all the powers of an
investigative body under Section 37, Chapter 9, Book I of the Administrative
Code of 1987, is primarily tasked to conduct a thorough fact-finding
investigation of reported cases of graft and corruption referred to in Section
1, involving third level public officers and higher, their co-principals,
accomplices and accessories from the private sector, if any, during the previous
administration and thereafter submit its finding and recommendations to the
President, Congress and the Ombudsman.
In particular, it shall:
a)
Identify and determine the reported cases of such graft and
corruption which it will investigate;
b)
Collect, receive, review and evaluate evidence related to or
regarding the cases of large scale corruption which it has chosen to
investigate, and to this end require any agency, official or employee of the
Executive Branch, including government-owned or controlled corporations, to
produce documents, books, records and other papers;
c)
Upon proper request or representation, obtain information and
documents from the Senate and the House of Representatives records of
investigations conducted by committees thereof relating to matters or subjects
being investigated by the Commission;
d)
Upon proper request and representation, obtain information from
the courts, including the Sandiganbayan and the Office of the Court
Administrator, information or documents in respect to corruption cases filed
with the Sandiganbayan or the regular courts, as the case may be;
e)
Invite or subpoena witnesses and take their testimonies and for
that purpose, administer oaths or affirmations as the case may be;
f)
Recommend, in cases where there is a need to utilize any person as
a state witness to ensure that the ends of justice be fully served, that such
person who qualifies as a state witness under the Revised Rules of Court of the
Philippines be admitted for that purpose;
g)
Turn over from time to time, for expeditious prosecution, to the
appropriate prosecutorial authorities, by means of a special or interim report and recommendation, all evidence
on corruption of public officers and employees and their private sector
co-principals, accomplices or accessories, if any, when in the course of its
investigation the Commission finds that there is reasonable ground to believe
that they are liable for graft and corruption under pertinent applicable laws;
h)
Call upon any government investigative or prosecutorial agency
such as the Department of Justice or any of the agencies under it, and the
Presidential Anti-Graft Commission, for such assistance and cooperation as it
may require in the discharge of its functions and duties;
i)
Engage or contract the services of resource persons, professionals
and other personnel determined by it as necessary to carry out its mandate;
j)
Promulgate its rules and regulations or rules of procedure it
deems necessary to effectively and efficiently carry out the objectives of this
Executive Order and to ensure the orderly conduct of its investigations,
proceedings and hearings, including the presentation of evidence;
k)
Exercise such other acts incident to or are appropriate and
necessary in connection with the objectives and purposes of this Order.
SECTION 3. Staffing Requirements. – x x x.
SECTION 4. Detail of Employees. – x x x.
SECTION 5. Engagement of Experts. – x x x
SECTION 6. Conduct of Proceedings. – x x x.
SECTION 7. Right to Counsel of Witnesses/Resource Persons. – x x
x.
SECTION 8. Protection of Witnesses/Resource Persons. – x x x.
SECTION 9. Refusal to Obey Subpoena, Take Oath or Give Testimony. – Any government official or personnel who, without lawful excuse,
fails to appear upon subpoena issued by the Commission or who, appearing before
the Commission refuses to take oath or affirmation, give testimony or produce
documents for inspection, when required, shall be subject to administrative
disciplinary action. Any private person who does the same may be dealt with in
accordance with law.
SECTION 10. Duty to Extend Assistance to the Commission. – x x x.
SECTION 11. Budget for the Commission. – The Office of the President shall provide the necessary funds for
the Commission to ensure that it can exercise its powers, execute its
functions, and perform its duties and responsibilities as effectively,
efficiently, and expeditiously as possible.
SECTION 12. Office. – x x x.
SECTION 13. Furniture/Equipment. – x x x.
SECTION 14. Term of the Commission. – The Commission shall accomplish its mission on or before December
31, 2012.
SECTION 15. Publication of Final Report. – x x x.
SECTION 16. Transfer of Records and Facilities of the Commission.
– x x x.
SECTION 17. Special Provision Concerning Mandate. If and when in the judgment of the President there is a need to
expand the mandate of the Commission as defined in Section 1 hereof to include
the investigation of cases and instances of graft and corruption during the
prior administrations, such mandate may be so extended accordingly by way of a
supplemental Executive Order.
SECTION 18. Separability Clause. If any provision of this Order is declared unconstitutional, the
same shall not affect the validity and effectivity of the other provisions
hereof.
SECTION 19. Effectivity. –
This Executive Order shall take effect immediately.
The
Philippine Truth Commission (PTC) is a mere ad hoc body formed under the Office
of the President with the primary task to investigate reports of graft and
corruption committed by third-level public officers and employees, their
co-principals, accomplices and accessories during the previous administration,
and thereafter to submit its finding and recommendations to the President,
Congress and the Ombudsman. Though it has been described as an “independent
collegial body,” it is essentially an entity within the Office of the President
Proper and subject to his control.
To accomplish
its task, the PTC shall have all the powers of an investigative body under
Section 37, Chapter 9, Book I of the Administrative Code of 1987. It is not,
however, a quasi-judicial body as it cannot adjudicate, arbitrate, resolve,
settle, or render awards in disputes between contending parties. All it can do
is gather, collect and assess evidence of graft and corruption and make
recommendations. It may have subpoena powers but it has no power to cite people
in contempt, much less order their arrest. Although it is a fact-finding body,
it cannot determine from such facts if probable cause exists as to warrant the
filing of an information in our courts of law. Needless to state, it cannot
impose criminal, civil or administrative penalties or sanctions.
Truth commissions have been described as bodies that share the
following characteristics: (1) they
examine only past events; (2) they investigate patterns of abuse committed over
a period of time, as opposed to a particular event; (3) they are temporary
bodies that finish their work with the submission of a report containing
conclusions and recommendations; and (4) they are officially sanctioned,
authorized or empowered by the State. Commission’s members are usually
empowered to conduct research, support victims, and propose policy
recommendations to prevent recurrence of crimes. Through their
investigations, the commissions may aim to discover and learn more about past
abuses, or formally acknowledge them. They may aim to prepare the way for
prosecutions and recommend institutional reforms. Thus, their main goals range
from retribution to reconciliation.
Issue:
whether
or not the petitioners have the legal standing to file their respective
petitions and question Executive Order No. 1
Held:
Yes.
Petitioners-legislators’s petition primarily invokes usurpation of the power of
the Congress as a body to which they belong as members. This certainly
justifies their resolve to take the cudgels for Congress as an institution and
present the complaints on the usurpation of their power and rights as members
of the legislature before the Court.
To the extent
the powers of Congress are impaired, so is the power of each member thereof,
since his office confers a right to participate in the exercise of the powers
of that institution.
An act of the
Executive which injures the institution of Congress causes a derivative but
nonetheless substantial injury, which can be questioned by a member of
Congress. In such a case, any member of Congress can have a resort to the
courts.
Indeed,
legislators have a legal standing to see to it that the prerogative, powers and
privileges vested by the Constitution in their office remain inviolate. Thus,
they are allowed to question the validity of any official action which, to
their mind, infringes on their prerogatives as legislators.
With
regard to Biraogo, the OSG argues that, as a taxpayer, he has no standing to
question the creation of the PTC and the budget for its operations. It
emphasizes that the funds to be used for the creation and operation of the
commission are to be taken from those funds already appropriated by Congress.
Thus, the allocation and disbursement of funds for the commission will not
entail congressional action but will simply be an exercise of the President’s
power over contingent funds.
As correctly pointed out by the OSG, Biraogo has
not shown that he sustained, or is in danger of sustaining, any personal and
direct injury attributable to the implementation of Executive Order No. 1.
Nowhere in his petition is an assertion of a clear right that may justify his
clamor for the Court to exercise judicial power and to wield the axe over presidential
issuances in defense of the Constitution.
The
Court, however, finds reason in Biraogo’s assertion that the petition covers
matters of transcendental importance to justify the exercise of jurisdiction by
the Court. There are constitutional issues in the petition which deserve the
attention of this Court in view of their seriousness, novelty and weight as
precedents. Where the issues are of transcendental and paramount importance not
only to the public but also to the Bench and the Bar, they should be resolved
for the guidance of all. The Court takes cognizance of the petition not due to
overwhelming political undertones that clothe the issue in the eyes of the
public, but because the Court stands firm in its oath to perform its
constitutional duty to settle legal controversies with overreaching
significance to society.
Issue:
whether
or not Executive Order No. 1 violates the principle of separation of powers by
usurping the powers of Congress to create and to appropriate funds for public
offices, agencies and commissions; Does the creation of the PTC fall within the
ambit of the power to reorganize as expressed in Section 31 of the Revised
Administrative Code?
Issue:
Section
31 of the Revised Administrative Code contemplates “reorganization” as limited
by the following functional and structural lines: (1) restructuring the
internal organization of the Office of the President Proper by abolishing,
consolidating or merging units thereof or transferring functions from one unit
to another; (2) transferring any function under the Office of the President to
any other Department/Agency or vice versa; or (3) transferring any agency under
the Office of the President to any other Department/Agency or vice versa.
Clearly, the provision refers to reduction of personnel, consolidation of
offices, or abolition thereof by reason of economy or redundancy of functions.
These point to situations where a body or an office is already existent but a
modification or alteration thereof has to be effected. The creation of an
office is nowhere mentioned, much less envisioned in said provision.
Accordingly, the answer to the question is in the negative.
To say that
the PTC is borne out of a restructuring of the Office of the President under
Section 31 is a misplaced supposition, even in the plainest meaning
attributable to the term “restructure”– an “alteration of an existing
structure.” Evidently, the PTC was not part of the structure of the Office of
the President prior to the enactment of Executive Order No. 1.
The
President, subject to the policy in the Executive Office and in order to
achieve simplicity, economy and efficiency, shall have the continuing authority
to reorganize the administrative structure of the Office of the President. For
this purpose, he may transfer the functions of other Departments or Agencies to
the Office of the President. Reorganization
involves the reduction of personnel, consolidation of offices, or abolition
thereof by reason of economy or redundancy of functions. It takes place when
there is an alteration of the existing structure of government offices or units
therein, including the lines of control, authority and responsibility between
them.
In
the same vein, the creation of the PTC is not justified by the President’s
power of control. Control is
essentially the power to alter or modify or nullify or set aside what a
subordinate officer had done in the performance of his duties and to substitute
the judgment of the former with that of the latter. Clearly, the power of
control is entirely different from the power to create public offices. The
former is inherent in the Executive, while the latter finds basis from either a
valid delegation from Congress, or his inherent duty to faithfully execute the
laws.
The
creation of the PTC finds justification under Section 17, Article VII of the
Constitution, imposing upon the President the duty to ensure that the laws are
faithfully executed. Section 17 reads:
Section 17. The President shall have control of all
the executive departments, bureaus, and offices. He shall ensure that the laws
be faithfully executed.
The
President’s power to conduct investigations to aid him in ensuring the faithful
execution of laws – in this case, fundamental laws on public accountability and
transparency – is inherent in the President’s powers as the Chief Executive.
That the authority of the President to conduct investigations and to create
bodies to execute this power is not explicitly mentioned in the Constitution or
in statutes does not mean that he is bereft of such authority.
The
powers of the President are not limited to those specific powers under the
Constitution. One of the recognized powers of the President granted pursuant to
this constitutionally-mandated duty is the power to create ad hoc committees. This
flows from the obvious need to ascertain facts and determine if laws have been
faithfully executed.
The
purpose of allowing ad hoc investigating bodies to exist is to allow an inquiry
into matters which the President is entitled to know so that he can be properly
advised and guided in the performance of his duties relative to the execution
and enforcement of the laws of the land. There being no changes in the
government structure, the Court is not inclined to declare such executive power
as non-existent just because the direction of the political winds have changed.
On the charge
that Executive Order No. 1 transgresses the power of Congress to appropriate
funds for the operation of a public office, suffice it to say that there will
be no appropriation but only an allotment or allocations of existing funds
already appropriated. Accordingly, there is no usurpation on the part of the
Executive of the power of Congress to appropriate funds. Further, there is no
need to specify the amount to be earmarked for the operation of the commission
because, in the words of the Solicitor General, whatever funds the Congress has
provided for the Office of the President will be the very source of the funds
for the commission. Moreover, since the amount that would be allocated to the
PTC shall be subject to existing auditing rules and regulations, there is no
impropriety in the funding.
Issue:
whether
or not Executive Order No. 1 supplants the powers of the Ombudsman and the DOJ
Held:
The
President’s power to conduct investigations to ensure that laws are faithfully
executed is well recognized. As the Chief Executive, the president represents
the government as a whole and sees to it that all laws are enforced by the
officials and employees of his department. He has the authority to directly
assume the functions of the executive department.
Invoking
this authority, the President constituted the PTC to primarily investigate
reports of graft and corruption and to recommend the appropriate action. No
quasi-judicial powers have been vested in the said body as it cannot adjudicate
rights of persons who come before it. Quasi-judicial
powers involve the power to hear and determine questions of fact to which
the legislative policy is to apply and to decide in accordance with the
standards laid down by law itself in enforcing and administering the same law.
In simpler terms, judicial discretion is involved in the exercise of these
quasi-judicial power, such that it is exclusively vested in the judiciary and
must be clearly authorized by the legislature in the case of administrative
agencies.
Fact-finding
is not adjudication and it cannot be likened to the judicial function of a
court of justice, or even a quasi-judicial agency or office. The function of
receiving evidence and ascertaining therefrom the facts of a controversy is not
a judicial function. To be considered as such, the act of receiving evidence
and arriving at factual conclusions in a controversy must be accompanied by the
authority of applying the law to the factual conclusions to the end that the
controversy may be decided or resolved authoritatively, finally and
definitively, subject to appeals or modes of review as may be provided by law.
Even respondents themselves admit that the commission is bereft of any quasi-judicial
power.
Contrary to
petitioners’ apprehension, the PTC will not supplant the Ombudsman or the DOJ
or erode their respective powers. If at all, the investigative function of the
commission will complement those of the two offices. The recommendation to
prosecute is but a consequence of the overall task of the commission to conduct
a fact-finding investigation. The actual prosecution of suspected offenders,
much less adjudication on the merits of the charges against them, is certainly
not a function given to the commission. The phrase, “when in the course of its
investigation,” under Section 2(g), highlights this fact and gives credence to
a contrary interpretation from that of the petitioners. The function of
determining probable cause for the filing of the appropriate complaints before
the courts remains to be with the DOJ and the Ombudsman.
At any rate,
the Ombudsman’s power to investigate under R.A. No. 6770 is not exclusive but
is shared with other similarly authorized government agencies such as the PCGG
and judges of municipal trial courts and municipal circuit trial courts. The
power to conduct preliminary investigation on charges against public employees
and officials is likewise concurrently shared with the Department of Justice.
Despite the passage of the Local Government Code in 1991, the Ombudsman retains
concurrent jurisdiction with the Office of the President and the local
Sanggunians to investigate complaints against local elective officials.
Also,
Executive Order No. 1 cannot contravene the power of the Ombudsman to
investigate criminal cases under Section 15 (1) of R.A. No. 6770, which states:
(1) Investigate and prosecute on its own or on
complaint by any person, any act or omission of any public officer or employee,
office or agency, when such act or omission appears to be illegal, unjust,
improper or inefficient. It has primary jurisdiction over cases cognizable by
the Sandiganbayan and, in the exercise of its primary jurisdiction, it may take
over, at any stage, from any investigatory agency of government, the
investigation of such cases.
The act of
investigation by the Ombudsman as enunciated above contemplates the conduct of
a preliminary investigation or the determination of the existence of probable
cause. This is categorically out of the PTC’s sphere of functions. Its power to
investigate is limited to obtaining facts so that it can advise and guide the
President in the performance of his duties relative to the execution and
enforcement of the laws of the land. In this regard, the PTC commits no act of
usurpation of the Ombudsman’s primordial duties.
The same holds
true with respect to the DOJ. Its authority under Section 3 (2), Chapter 1,
Title III, Book IV in the Revised Administrative Code is by no means exclusive
and, thus, can be shared with a body likewise tasked to investigate the
commission of crimes.
Finally,
nowhere in Executive Order No. 1 can it be inferred that the findings of the
PTC are to be accorded conclusiveness. Its findings would, at best, be
recommendatory in nature. And being so, the Ombudsman and the DOJ have a wider
degree of latitude to decide whether or not to reject the recommendation. These
offices, therefore, are not deprived of their mandated duties but will instead
be aided by the reports of the PTC for possible indictments for violations of
graft laws.
Issue:
whether
or not Executive Order No. 1 violates the equal protection clause
Held:
Although
the purpose of the Truth Commission falls within the investigative power of the
President, the Court finds difficulty in upholding the constitutionality of
Executive Order No. 1 in view of its apparent transgression of the equal
protection clause enshrined in Section 1, Article III (Bill of Rights) of the
1987 Constitution.
Equal protection simply requires that
all persons or things similarly situated should be treated alike, both as to
rights conferred and responsibilities imposed. It requires public bodies and
institutions to treat similarly situated individuals in a similar manner. The
purpose of the equal protection clause is to secure every person within a
state’s jurisdiction against intentional and arbitrary discrimination, whether
occasioned by the express terms of a statue or by its improper execution
through the state’s duly constituted authorities. In other words, the concept
of equal justice under the law requires the state to govern impartially, and it
may not draw distinctions between individuals solely on differences that are
irrelevant to a legitimate governmental objective.
The equal
protection clause is aimed at all official state actions, not just those of the
legislature. Its inhibitions cover all the departments of the government
including the political and executive departments, and extend to all actions of
a state denying equal protection of the laws, through whatever agency or
whatever guise is taken.
It, however,
does not require the universal application of the laws to all persons or things
without distinction. What it simply requires is equality among equals as
determined according to a valid classification. Indeed, the equal protection
clause permits classification. Such classification, however, to be valid must
pass the test ofreasonableness. The test has four requisites: (1) The classification rests on substantial
distinctions; (2) It is germane to the purpose of the law; (3) It is not
limited to existing conditions only; and (4) It applies equally to all members
of the same class. Superficial differences do not make for a valid
classification.
For a
classification to meet the requirements of constitutionality, it must include
or embrace all persons who naturally belong to the class. The classification
will be regarded as invalid if all the members of the class are not similarly
treated, both as to rights conferred and obligations imposed. It is not
necessary that the classification be made with absolute symmetry, in the sense
that the members of the class should possess the same characteristics in equal
degree. Substantial similarity will suffice; and as long as this is achieved,
all those covered by the classification are to be treated equally. The mere
fact that an individual belonging to a class differs from the other members, as
long as that class is substantially distinguishable from all others, does not
justify the non-application of the law to him.
The
classification must not be based on existing circumstances only, or so
constituted as to preclude addition to the number included in the class. It
must be of such a nature as to embrace all those who may thereafter be in
similar circumstances and conditions. It must not leave out or “underinclude”
those that should otherwise fall into a certain classification.
The equal protection of the laws clause
of the Constitution allows classification. Classification in law, as in the
other departments of knowledge or practice, is the grouping of things in
speculation or practice because they agree with one another in certain
particulars. A law is not invalid because of simple inequality. The very idea
of classification is that of inequality, so that it goes without saying that
the mere fact of inequality in no manner determines the matter of
constitutionality. All that is required of a valid classification is that it be
reasonable, which means that the classification should be based on substantial
distinctions which make for real differences, that it must be germane to the
purpose of the law; that it must not be limited to existing conditions only;
and that it must apply equally to each member of the class. This Court has held
that the standard is satisfied if the classification or distinction is based on
a reasonable foundation or rational basis and is not palpably arbitrary.
Applying these
precepts to this case, Executive Order No. 1 should be struck down as violative
of the equal protection clause. The clear mandate of the envisioned truth
commission is to investigate and find out the truth concerning the reported
cases of graft and corruption during the previous administration only. The intent to single out the previous administration is
plain, patent and manifest. Mention of it has been made in at least three
portions of the questioned executive order. Specifically, these are:
WHEREAS, there is a need for a separate body dedicated solely to
investigating and finding out the truth concerning the reported cases of graft
and corruption during the previous administration, and which will recommend the
prosecution of the offenders and secure justice for all;
SECTION 1. Creation of a Commission. – There is hereby
created the PHILIPPINE TRUTH COMMISSION, hereinafter referred to as the “COMMISSION,” which shall primarily seek and find the
truth on, and toward this end, investigate reports of graft and corruption of
such scale and magnitude that shock and offend the moral and ethical sensibilities
of the people, committed by public officers and employees, their co-principals,
accomplices and accessories from the private sector, if any, during the
previous administration; and thereafter recommend the appropriate action or
measure to be taken thereon to ensure that the full measure of justice shall be
served without fear or favor.
SECTION 2. Powers and Functions. – The Commission, which shall have all the powers of an
investigative body under Section 37, Chapter 9, Book I of the Administrative
Code of 1987, is primarily tasked to conduct a thorough fact-finding
investigation of reported cases of graft and corruption referred to in Section
1, involving third level public officers and higher, their co-principals,
accomplices and accessories from the private sector, if any, during the
previous administration and thereafter submit its finding and recommendations
to the President, Congress and the Ombudsman. [Emphases supplied]
In this regard, it must be borne in
mind that the Arroyo administration is but just a member of a class, that is, a
class of past administrations. It is not a class of its own. Not to include
past administrations similarly situated constitutes arbitrariness which the
equal protection clause cannot sanction. Such discriminating differentiation
clearly reverberates to label the commission as a vehicle for vindictiveness
and selective retribution.
The reports of widespread corruption in
the Arroyo administration cannot be taken as basis for distinguishing said
administration from earlier administrations which were also blemished by
similar widespread reports of impropriety. They are not inherent in, and do not
inure solely to, the Arroyo administration.
Executive Order No. 1 suffers from
arbitrary classification. The PTC, to be true to its mandate of searching for
the truth, must not exclude the other past administrations. The PTC must, at
least, have the authority to investigate all past administrations. While reasonable
prioritization is permitted, it should not be arbitrary lest it be struck
down for being unconstitutional.
